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

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the ALTERNATIVE to bare the witness and the truth

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Published remarkably without regard to race, color, creed or (most redundantly of all) national origin—and yes, sex, even sex.

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☆The Continuing Crisis☆

● October . . . Halloween and ghouls and children in false faces! October featured the thrilling liquidation of a vice-president, Arab aggression, Arab retreat, and President Nixon's continuing magic act: Mr. Elliot Richardson, Mr. William Ruckelshaus, and Mr. Archibald Cox disappeared; the Rt. Hon. Gerald Ford became bigger than life; and there appeared in Pascagoula, Mississippi, three extra-terrestrial sightseers. Halfway through the month Miss Sally Quinn threw up while reporting the CBS Morning News. Nevertheless Oakland won the World Series, and Dr. Phillip Tobias revealed that if Homo sapiens persists in wearing shoes and consuming what he referred to as "mush-cooked" viands their small toes and wisdom teeth will be irretrievably lost.

● For the ghouls it was an incomparable month. It began with the Vice-President "twisting slowly in the wind" and ended with "the Veep" reduced to the proportions of a "common criminal." Along the way it was noted by the eminentoes of pop letters that "the Veep" was "always carefully dressed" and "without a hair out of place." It was a good month for hackneyed phrases and drones of the nonce.

● Unfortunately the remains of Mr. Billy Joe Poyne may be appearing on breakfast tables throughout the country. Mr. Poyne apparently fell into a berry-picking machine, and much of him went unnoticed until a large breakfast cereal manufacturer reported finding parts of his wallet in a berry carton in their warehouse. On a happier note, Mr. Kevin McGoff has had his head released. Mr. McGoff's head was trapped in an elevator for eighteen hours. It had been wedged between the roof of the elevator and the elevator shaft, leaving him dangling in midair as was shown in some spectacular news photos, which the media-conscious Mr. McGoff posed for the next day. From British Columbia comes word that 30 percent of the 80 million dogs and cats in North America suffer dandruff, pimples, and sunburn nose. In Pascagoula, Mississippi, the good old boys snickered when Mr. Charles Hickson and Mr. Calvin Parker claimed they had been interviewed by three missionaries from outer space, but when a Northwestern University astronomer and a University of California professor confirmed the story, they roared. The next day President Nixon held a preposterous White House ceremony, and amid violins, foreign notables, domestic solons, and hot air he unveiled Representative Gerald Ford, the next Vice-President of the United States.

● At 2 P.M. on the Jewish Day of Atonement Syrian and Egyptian armies struck across Israeli territory, shortly before their U.N. representatives rose to protest the cruel incursions of Israeli troops into Syria and Egypt on the holiest of all Jewish religious days. Then came Arab threats to limit oil and to crush Israel. Then came Russian war supplies to their Arab pawns. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan fell on Israel. And finally came the revelation that some Egyptian jets were being flown by recent converts to Islam from North Korea. So while Israel drubbed most of the Arab world and some of the Communist world, America opened what in an earlier day was called its Arsenal of Freedom and sent Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who this month won a share in the Nobel Peace Prize for his truce in Indochina, to arrange a similar truce in the Middle East, which he did. It was signed as the Israeli army pulled up some twenty miles outside Damascus and forty miles from Cairo. Fighting promptly resumed. The Department of Agriculture reports that oil-rich Kuwait has opened the Middle East's first Kentucky Fried Chicken shop. And that world-wide mobilization of U.S. troops, which

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Editorial

Two Cultures

Probably the most profound platitude one can utter today is that Americans have lost confidence in their institutions. As with many platitudes, this one happens to be true, and I expect there are a lot of reasons for the diminished confidence we hold in our institutions. For one, many of our institutions have fallen into the habit of promising far more than they can deliver, and many people would not want them any other way. For another reason, many institutions are undertaking far too much. Universities that in days of yore only attempted education got into the business of research and thence into all sorts of follies like urban reform, strategy planning, and something they call human development. One might say they moved from folly to folly. And of course we should never forget that many institutions are simply engaged in performing the impossible, and such performances are never apt to inspire much confidence from an audience. Finally, the keepers of many American institutions are making the mistake of defining things as problems which are not problems at all, but rather difficulties or conditions. Nevertheless the grunts and groans of institutions so engaged works hell on some persons' confidences. All of this might sound either exasperatingly academic or faintly sophistical, so allow me to suggest that the famous crisis in confidence, once patented as the credibility gap, exists only in the peculiar way many such crises exist in America.

That is to say it exists as a crisis in that part of America where talk is fervent and nationally infectious (not to say pathological). It exists in that part of America where crises are spawned. It exists in New York and Cambridge and Washington and all those cosmopolitan redoubts which sprawl across the nation like so many enlightened colonies.

The crisis in confidence certainly does not exist in the great American provinces—the average American never expected much from America's liberal democratic institutions anyway. It certainly does not exist as a crisis in Houston or in Phoenix or even in Chicago, at least not in Mayor Daley's office or in the Aldermanic Chamber, on the North Side or on the South Side. But I suspect that the shivers of a crisis in confidence are being felt through some of the suburbs. The crisis addles every editorial office. And I suspect it brings a scowl to the face of many a university professor at Northwestern and the University of Chicago. In fact it is probably just one of the many things that the average university professor holds in common with every Playboy bunny.

In order to reach those regions where the crisis in confidence or the credibility gap elicits gasps and raises blood pressures, one merely has to go to those hangouts where people earn their livings by flexing their tongues. Wherever talk and ideas abound there you will find the fever of crisis. And that makes the crisis a serious problem (or at least a difficulty) for all of us. Now the causes of this problem or difficulty are many. There is bureaucracy—which is the mode of the welfare state or the frankenstein of governmental benevolence. There is the syndrome of rising expectations—which is the pathogen of a kind of politicized benevolence. There is technological change or the alleged rate of that change. And there is the decline of religion. All have contributed in their prodigious ways to that sickly feeling we sense today when we muse on the prospects of the Great Republic.

And, I suppose that while I am at it I might as well throw in the larger causes. I do not believe any important thinker has undertaken a sufficiently dispassionate and Olympian analysis of the influence of the Cold War on our singular American institutions. Perhaps this is another way of saying we await our Thucydides. An examination of the more awesome question, to wit, history's melancholy deracination of the American Republic, would also shed light on today's crisis in confidence. But then alas, this might just be another way of saying we await our Gibbon.

All of this is to say that if the crisis of confidence strikes you as insignificant or if you seem vaguely to recognize it as a part of an advertisement for women's lingerie or deodorant, well, you are perfectly justified in your hazy perception. On the other hand, if you feel that something *is* shaking the foundations, you can choose from a wide variety of causes, all tailored for your particular paranoia.

As for me, I choose to view the matter somewhat differently. To me it is not a crisis in confidence that afflicts us but rather a slow and steady draining of authority from American institutions. The culprits who have pulled the plugs are often called intellectuals.

If there is one elemental nexus stretching from the Attica uprising to the glorious revolution of the campus on to the pother over the Pentagon Papers, the Watergate spectacle, women's liberation, gay liberation, the liberation of marijuana, the prohibition of hexachlorophene and on to the lofty moral high jinks which lends such charm to our Democratic conventions, it is the diminution of institutional or social authority.

This kind of a statement generally sets ritualistic liberals and their chic mutants to fussing and vibrating. They need not direct their heat upon me. I am not opposed to any of the above-listed glories. I have enjoyed the whole gaudy show. These last few years have provided me with joyful employment, and I have been vastly amused by every clubfooted step we have taken towards the New Age. For me it has been a gorgeous feast, though viewed more objectively and less personally, the late sixties and on to the present have been Liberalism's years of embarrassment, or America's years of embarrassment, and no doubt for many good persons they have been years of heartbreak. Well, too bad for them. The country has got to grow, and as the intellectuals have become a growth industry I expect authority will continue to drain or confidence diminish until finally . . . well by that time I shall reside with the angels and so good riddance.

Now it is always difficult to define a noun that has only recently evolved from an adjectival state. Certainly very few people call themselves intellectuals, at least not on resumés or in biographical sketches, and the term has often been used as an epithet of disparagement.

Robert Nisbet claims never to have heard the word "intellectual" used as a noun before the late forties, and in the thirties the word "writer" served the august purposes for which intellectual is now used. But make no mistake about it, today intellectual is a discreetly sought-after epithet, and this has been increasingly true probably since the 1962 publication of Richard Hofstadter's rather confusing denunciation of anti-intellectuals. At any rate it has been notoriously difficult to frame a definition of intellectual. The term has often loosely been applied to writers, artists, humanists, scholars, and scientists. And today I have no doubt that congeries of newspaper reporters, columnists, TV anchormen, librarians, computer jockeys, university administrators, medical technicians, typesetters, and insurance salesmen all secretly suspect that they too are intellectuals. After all, some very advanced ideas have personally influenced their lives in a very special way, known only to them, their select circle of like-minded friends, and the long-suffering bartender to whom they first unveil their clever or profound thoughts. In a way they all have a point. Ideas are increasingly the tools with which we work in a post-industrial world. But I think we can be somewhat more precise in limning the characteristics of intellectuals. For our purposes I have selected from the pages of *Commentary* Nathan Glazer's working definition: "Intellectuals are people who make a living from ideas, and are in varying degrees directly influenced by ideas. Thus they live off ideas and they live for ideas." Politically, intellectuals have in general been critical of established institutions and values, sometimes from the Right, more often from the Left.

Intellectuals are as much an interest group as pig farmers. They hold common attitudes and beliefs and most earn their livings from a limited number of occupations that are all very closely related. Up until the postwar period intellectuals inhabited a very limited turf. Their population was small, and their influence much different than it is today. Before discussing their current condition, let me proceed a little further in this exercise in the taxidermy of the intellectual.

One of their identifying qualities is a commitment to ideas as such. As Lewis Coser has written, intellectuals are "gatekeepers of ideas and fountainheads of ideologies." As Coser emphasized intellectuals transform conflicts of interests into conflicts of values and ideas. Thus they "increase a society's self-knowledge by making manifest its latent sources of discomfort and discontent."

Second is the quality of moral commitment. Unlike the scholar or the scientist, the intellectual is a committed judge of his times. Now this is also the pastime of the clergy, and if we are to distinguish the two we should add a third quality.

This Coser refers to as the quality of "play." "While earnest practitioners tend to focus on the tasks at hand, the intellectual delights in the play of the mind and re-

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The Business of America



by Lindley H. Clark Jr.

Lessons in Free Enterprise (II)

What follows is the second of four columns by the economic news editor of the Wall Street Journal *on the practice of business in America.*

In recent years "the social responsibility of business" has been a major cause urged by intellectuals and accepted, with charming naiveté, by hundreds of businessmen who ought to know better. Business exists not solely to make a profit, intone many corporate presidents, but to serve the public good.

There are limits to this business willingness to cast aside crass commercialism, however. In the inflation of the late 1960s and early 1970s, no businessman we've noticed has come forth to forswear forever all price increases, despite the fact that the public good surely would be served by stable prices.

In the first place, most intelligent businessmen know they are not to blame for inflation. If they possess monopoly power, government is to blame for inadequate enforcement of the antitrust laws. If they possess no such power, competition will roll back any over-large price increases—unless the government is floating the whole economy upward by printing too much money.

Not so incidentally, labor unions are subject to the same restraint. If they push through excessive wage increases, they will only price some of their members out of the labor market—unless government validates the increases by inflating the economy.

More broadly, many businessmen presumably recognize that swearing off price increases serves neither the interest of their enterprise nor the true public good. If a commodity is in short supply, a price increase encourages more production, both by present producers and often by new ones. As supply rises, price will tend to fall.

If, on the other hand, the price is held down, the result is to discourage production. If the product is something the public wants or needs, it soon finds it cannot buy as many as it needs or wants. Soon a paternalistic government is likely to step in and ration out the available supply.

What many businessmen, as well as many members of the general public, seem not to recognize is that by embracing social responsibility in general they also are not serving the interests of a free society. They are in fact adopting a peculiar form of socialism.

Let us say, for instance, that a "socially responsible" businessman elects to hire only members of a minority group, whether they are qualified or not, instead of hiring qualified workers, regardless of race, creed, or color. No one questions that the minority in the past has been subject to serious discrimination, so how can anyone object to the businessman doing his part to right past wrongs?

Well, the owners of the business may object. The do-good project is likely to cut sharply into company earnings and dividends. And customers may object, since an inferior work force is likely to produce inferior products and service. Both owners and customers are in effect being taxed by the businessman, who has actually elected himself as a sort of government official, to finance and administer his self-designed project to improve the public welfare.

More than that: The project is likely to waste resources of capital, machinery, and management. Yet there will be no democratic pressures to dissuade the businessman from his unwitting venture into socialism.

No one is saying that the minority group should not be helped. But in a free society the aid should stem from a conscious decision of the body politic, not from the random whims of businessmen. The public's elected representatives have the power to devise programs and to levy taxes to finance them. If the public does not like the programs or the taxes, it can throw out the representatives and get new ones.

In recent years many corporations have been subject to strong pressure from the public or from minority stockholders to support numerous public causes. When corporations cave in under such pressure, they once again are levying a tax on their stockholders for a purpose that the stockholders, or at least the bulk of them, have not approved. The corporations once again are weakening their chances to survive and to continue to render efficient service to the public.

There are of course many legitimate reasons for corporations to do what superficially may appear to be only "good deeds." A few carefully selected gifts to charity may improve a corporation's image and win it friends among potential customers and stockholders. Hiring handicapped workers often can be very good business, since such workers frequently are not only highly qualified but highly motivated to make good on a job—and keep it.

Many corporations will encourage their executives and employees to take part in social-interest projects in the communities where the companies operate. They may even give the employees time off for such projects. If the company is honest about it—and many firms are not—it will admit that the overriding aim is to enhance the position of the corporation in the community where it operates.

In these times when corporations generally have been having their troubles with their public image, a certain amount of this sort of advertising can be justified on a purely profit-seeking basis. Unfortunately, it is all too easy for a company to slip over the line that divides profit-seeking from halo-seeking. The cases of corporate directors using the stockholders' money to support their favorite charities are far from rare.

The primary responsibility of business still has to be business. If a businessman produces the best products he can and provides the best possible service, he will serve his interests, the interests of the owners of the business, and the interests of the general public.

It's partly a matter of competence. No matter how well-intentioned the businessman may be, he's likely to be much more adept at running an assembly line than he is at planning and administering a social program. If he doubts that, he should examine the performance record of the trained professionals who have devised and operated the multiplicity of social programs set up by federal and state governments in recent years. The record has been sorry enough; does he think that he, an amateur, can do better?

It's surely worth mentioning that an efficient, profit-seeking business establishment is the chief source of the tax revenues that support public social programs, good and bad. It either pays the taxes itself or its employees pay them on the incomes that the businesses generate.

None of this should be read as an argument that business, if it concentrates on profits, will automatically serve the public interest to perfection. There must be rules. The best known of these are probably the antitrust laws. Imperfect in design and execution, these laws need to be improved. But government can and must see to it that businessmen don't combine among themselves against the public.

If the public's representatives decide that pollution of the air and water must be combatted, they can and do pass laws that force businessmen to join in the fight. The fact that these laws do not always result from a careful weighing of costs and benefits is surely no argument that businessmen should willy-nilly take on the fight themselves. Pollution regulations are a tax imposed on business and, through higher prices, the general public. Even if all business would adopt adequate regulation, it still would mean that private bodies were imposing public taxes.

Government can help to make business more responsible by making it more competitive. Restrictions on imports surely work against competition and against the public interest. Fair-trade laws, now thankfully on the decline, work in the same direction.

Adam Smith, that early advocate of free enterprise, recognized the need for rules. He also saw the foolishness of the "social responsibility of business." In *The Wealth of Nations* he wrote: "I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an affectation." □

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the ALTERNATIVE December 1973

Justus M. van der Kroef

Southeast Asia: Accommodation or Surrender?

At the close of July this year, Thailand's Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn announced in Bangkok that he was cancelling planned visits to several Southeast Asian neighbor states in view of the increasing gravity of the situation in Indochina. Not only was North Vietnam continuing to pour its troops, tanks, and heavy artillery into South Vietnam, despite the cease-fire agreement, Thanom charged; but also, according to the Thai Premier, North Vietnamese and Communist Pathet Lao forces in Laos were moving closer to Thailand's own northern and northeastern border provinces, the very region where a Communist guerrilla insurgency, which Bangkok claims is supported by Peking, the Pathet Lao, and Hanoi has been in progress. Thanom's announcement underscored again that with the failure of the January 27 Paris cease-fire agreement—a failure compounded to the point of farce by the June 13 reiteration of the original cease-fire accord—the Southeast Asian states today are further than ever from attaining that measure of individual or collective security and peace that would permit them to sustain much needed economic and public administrative growth with reasonable stability.

Several lines of development have intersected to bring about the region's present predicament. First we must note that U.S. reluctance to get into a new land war in Asia is to a degree appreciated and even lauded in some Southeast Asian capitals. Up to a point the Nixon Doctrine presents no problem to Southeast Asia. For a key element of that doctrine, that the United States henceforth expects to "look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense" has for some time been in accord with the tactical considerations of most Southeast Asian leaders themselves, well aware of the nationalist sensitivities of their citizenries about alleged U.S. or other foreign military "dominance" of their own countries and region. The question, rather, is about the U.S. readiness to sustain regions already committed to an active, first-line defense of their territory against Communist attack, not only against external invasion (e.g., continued North Vietnamese military encroachment in Laos and Cambodia, or the Chinese troops in northern Laos or northeastern Burma) but against the more insidious forms of foreign-supported domestic Communist insurgency (of which Thailand is perhaps the best known but by no means the only Southeast Asian example). Fear that the Nixon Doctrine is but a fig leaf for a U.S. retreat, even from its remaining treaty responsibilities, has markedly grown in the Southeast Asian region.

This anxiety is sharpened by the well-known Nixon-Kissinger vision of a "more fluid and heterogeneous multipolar international order," an order which is somehow going to be "more balanced and stable because it rests on broader, more diversified foundations," and reflects "an even balance" between the United States, USSR, People's China, Europe, and Japan. For the young Southeast Asian states it is not the trenchant western academic criticism by the Hoffmans and the Brzezinskis, to the effect that the Nixon envisaged balance of power is unlikely to be achieved, that is a primary justification for alarm. Southeast Asian considerations are more parochial than that. Instead, there is mounting concern that new big nation diplomacy and power balance strategies will increasingly make of the lesser countries so many fleeting nuisances or international bagatelles, to be ignored or disposed of as occasion demands. Given the domestic weaknesses of the Southeast Asian states, their location in the area of Hanoi's and Peking's expansionist interests at the very time that the USSR also has been mounting a significant diplomatic-strategic offensive in Southeast Asia, and given the continuing uncertainties rising out of the Sino-Soviet dispute no less than out of an administration in Washington emasculated by the Watergate scandal and by its ignoble deception surrounding its Cambodian bombings—in light, then, of all these, the urgency now has become one of finding a new political or strategic mechanism that can offer survival.

Preferred would be survival other than as a client state of any of the super powers. As Singapore's Premier Lee Kuan Yew put it last March 17: "For small countries the question now is not how to avoid being sucked into the warring camps of the two great powers, but how to have their interests taken into consideration when the great powers reach their compromises." Lee, on this particular occasion at least (for he has not always been so sanguine), may have been unduly optimistic. There is no indication that the super-states are really willing to work out a mutual *modus vivendi* in Southeast Asia. In its absence the Nixon Doctrine and the "multipolar international order" seem but schemes to legalize Southeast Asia's new client status *vis-à-vis* Hanoi, Moscow, or Peking. The prevailing state of affairs reminds one of the last days of the Roman Empire, when, with security and order collapsing, remaining imperial officials exhorted all men to find their own individual protectors. Thus India, in August 1971, confronted with the Bangla Desh catastrophe and its dangerous international implications, dropped all further pretense of "non-aligned" status and formally opted for Soviet protection and a twenty-year security treaty with Moscow. Lee himself has warned a visiting delegation of Australian politicians in Singapore in November 1972 that any power vacuum in his region, including one resulting from the withdrawal of token British, Australian, and New Zealand forces now stationed in Singapore, would quickly be filled by the Soviets. In conversations with Thai and Singapore defense officials in June 1973, I heard variants on the same theme and open skepticism that, even in its modified form under the Nixon Doctrine, an ultimate American deterrent can still be trusted.

The point is worth stressing. For one of the illusions flowing from the much vaunted Nixon initiatives toward Peking and Moscow is that these presumably have given Washington new leverage in dealing with the Communists, permitting her to side now with one, then with the other Communist super power in order to keep the tensions between them within bounds, or, to win an acceptable new *modus vivendi* in Southeast Asia. The reason why such a contention is illusory is because it assumes

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a belief that the United States necessarily has the will to use its countervailing power in order to prevent Sino-Soviet hostility from exploding, say, over future friction in Southeast Asia. As has been cogently observed by Professor David Nelson Rowe: "Our refusal to take in Vietnam the comparatively minor military risks which might have settled that conflict years ago because we did not want to get involved with Communist China" hardly argues in favor of an American willingness now to become "directly involved militarily between Communist China and the USSR" (*Issues and Studies* [Taipei], May 1970, p. 20).

The profound disquiet among key Southeast Asian leaders today regarding the future credibility of American power is deepened by persistent evidence of apparent U.S. prevarication in its Indochina policies. Consider, for instance, the miasma of unreality that surrounds the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho January 27, 1973, cease-fire agreement on Vietnam. By early May, 1973, the North Vietnamese (according to the *New York Times*) had slipped into the northern parts of South Vietnam "thousands of tons of ammunition, arms and military equipment," including surface-to-air missiles, tanks, and heavy anti-aircraft guns, and continuing fighting and mounting evidence of North Vietnamese plans for an impending major offensive in the South ripped the last remnants of the January cease-fire agreement to shreds. At about the same time, in Bangkok, Dr. Kissinger's assistant, Mr. William Sullivan, suggested that Hanoi had ambitions to control all of Indochina "and consequently had failed to fulfill its obligations under the Paris agreements." In light of this one wonders what Dr. Kissinger hoped to gain by signing yet another cease-fire agreement with Le Duc Tho in Paris on June 13 (or rather by pledging, along with the Saigon and Hanoi governments, and the Vietcong, "to strictly respect" the January cease-fire agreement), or by adhering to such meaningless promises as respect for the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos (where fighting immediately intensified). In any case, within twenty-four hours Saigon reported some eighty violations of the new June 13 cease-fire agreement, setting a pattern that has prevailed until this day.

As for South Vietnam, so also for Laos where, thanks to strong U.S. pressure the Royal Laotian government was, on February 21, 1973, induced to sign an agreement with the Communist Pathet Lao. This agreement in effect legalizes the Communist conquest of nearly half of the kingdom (accomplished, since 1962, in the slow, standard, "two steps forward, one step back" manner perfected by Southeast Asian Communists careful not to arouse alarm and massive counterstrikes), compels the remainder to be governed by a coalition government, and tacitly permits the continuing presence in Laos of thousands of North Vietnamese forces while mentioning U.S. and Thai forces by name as among the foreign troops to be withdrawn. With neat understatement, a SEATO assessment of the February 21 Laos arrangement declared that "the present agreement seems to have failed to provide adequate guarantees for lasting political stability in Laos." By early August, yet another agreement was in the works between the Pathet Lao and Laotian government, designed to legitimize still further Communist gains. The tragic futility of the anti-Communist coup attempt of Laotian General Thao Ma on August 20, 1973, an attempt apparently made in order to halt the *de facto* surrender by Premier Souvanna Phouma to the Communists, also highlighted American intentions. The United States' swift repudiation of the coup attempt and endorsement of Souvanna Phouma's policies left no doubt that a *de facto* Communist Laos is apparently quite satisfactory to the Nixon policies.

Nor would the United States long defend Cambodia, not even after Sihanouk's removal from power, which, like Sukarno's fall in Indonesia, was a turning point in recent Southeast Asian history that opened up the possibility of dramatic new initiatives in checking the Communist advance in the region. But the U.S. public was not about to be told of the great issues that hung in the balance in Cambodia, of the danger to the new Lon Nol-Siri Matak regime, and of the promise for all of Indochina implicit in its survival. The brief "surgical" U.S. thrust into Cambodia in May 1970 thus had to be sold to the American public on the basis of its potential relief for remaining American forces in Vietnam, not on the basis of what it might mean to the beleaguered anti-Communists in Phnom Penh who with one stroke had opened such a significant new perspective on the Indochina war. "Doesn't your Mr. Nixon see what an opportunity has come his way?" one Singapore student editor plaintively remarked to me at the time. Whatever ideas the Nixon Administration might have had of exploiting the fall of Sihanouk soon vanished as the upsurge in antiwar hysteria in the United States, ably fanned by the Hanoids around the world at the time of the Cambodian invasion, made it clear (if Nixon needed to be reminded) how the dynamics of domestic American politics on the war operated.

Nothing, then, would be permitted to interfere with the American retreat. Well before the formal cessation of U.S. Indochina airstrikes on August 15, 1973, political expectations and attitudes concerning the future security of the region had begun to crystallize. Some countries of the area, notably Thailand and the island state of Singapore, gently or vociferously made it plain, at first, that a continuing and direct American military presence in Southeast Asia was indispensible. Already in March of 1973, when it had become abundantly clear that the January 27 Vietnam "cease-fire" wasn't working, Thailand's Deputy Premier Prapass Charusathiara warned against undue expectations about the efficacy of the Laos and Vietnam agreements, adding that peace hopes for Southeast Asia "are only a dream." Thai Deputy Foreign Minister Chartchai Chunhawan, at about the same time, said that U.S. airforce units "must continue to be based in Thailand" until "real peace in Indochina" prevailed. Somewhat earlier, Singapore's Premier Lee Kuan Yew had said that retention of U.S. air forces in Thailand would be "an American demonstration of their clear intention that the [Nixon] Doctrine will be implemented." With heroic disregard of American academic deprecation of the domino theory, Lee asserted that without the Thai "buffer" the "spread of indigenous Communism supported by fraternal parties in neighboring countries" of Southeast Asia, would be "a foregone conclusion"; indeed, in April 1973, Lee, during a Washington visit, even dared to tell the National Press Club that American intervention in Vietnam had broken the string of Communist victories in Asia and thus had prevented "a stampede to the Communist side."

Such heresies, predictably, got little official or media attention in the United States, and by August 1973 it had been announced that the United States would shortly begin discussions on "incremental reductions" of its B-52 bomber fleet and 40,000 man U.S. military contingent in Thailand, urged on by the growing fluttering in the congressional and academic dovecotes. Meanwhile, Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's Labour government, apparently obsessed with transforming his country into People's China's dearest Asian-Pacific friend as soon as possible, had begun preparations for an "incremental" withdrawal of his own, i.e., of the remaining Australian military support units in Singapore and of the two Australian Mirage jet fighter squadrons stationed in Western Malaysia, which have been part of the now rapidly deteriorating so-called Commonwealth Five Power Defense agreement (involving Malaysia, Singapore, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand). The consequences of all this are best summarized by the title of a recent essay on the future of the Southeast Asian countries in the most prestigious Far Eastern news weekly: "To Peking, slowly."

Recent Thai attitudes are perhaps most indicative, with the Bangkok government now (1) approving Thai participation in planned "Afro-Asian-Latin American" ping pong tournaments in Peking, (2) speculating on a new "two China" policy, (3) permitting Peking to open up an ECAFE office in Bangkok, (4) instructing its diplomats in various world capitals "to be on cordial terms with the Chinese envoys," and so on (cf. the *Bangkok Post*, Jan. 18, March 26, May 29, 1973). Since the summer of 1973 all one's conversations with Thai diplomats and top military spokesmen have begun to pivot on two questions that reflect Thailand's dilemma: "What, now, is the Nixon Doctrine worth—after Cambodia, Laos, and the failure of the Vietnam cease-fire?" and "How far must we accommodate Peking and Hanoi in Nixon's new super power diplomacy?" Thai leaders are already beginning to answer their own questions,

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however. By July 1973 Thai Premier Kittikachorn was publicly expressing hope that "time, stability, and mutual understanding" would bring improvements in relations with China. Deputy Foreign Minister Chartchai Chunhawan meanwhile declared that Thailand was now ready to discuss the withdrawal of American forces from his country, adding that "our policy is the same as that of American congressmen who want their troops recalled"—a rather sharp *volte-face* compared to Chartchai's position a few months earlier. As for Singapore, the hardliners in its ruling People's Action Party have won the day for new massive increases in total annual defense expenditures (now approximating a third of its gross national product) accentuating the island republic's favorite self-image as a "poisoned shrimp" which an enemy might be foolish enough to try to swallow, but which would be impossible to keep down.

But there are other and, to some, more sanguine policy approaches, in which nominally Thailand and Singapore, and some other countries of the region, also share. There is, for example, the scheme to "neutralize" Southeast Asia in the manner of Austria, say, and to try and persuade all the major powers henceforth to leave the region alone. Malaysia, though confronted with persistent, Peking-backed, Communist guerrilla insurgency, both along its eastern border with Thailand and its western border with Indonesia, has been the chief champion of this idea, ultimately succeeding in persuading the foreign ministers of its neighbors, specifically Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, to endorse "neutralization" officially on November 27, 1971, in the so-called "Kuala Lumpur Declaration." These five nations comprise the so-called Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967 as a regional cooperative and consultative grouping. Slowly but steadily ASEAN has evolved into a major international forum and policy coordinating body for the whole of Southeast Asia.

But ASEAN members differ widely on the present viability of the neutralization concept, although all see it, at least in theory, as a policy ideal. The question, as Thai and Singapore spokesmen are fond of stressing these days, is whether Mr. Nixon's "fluid" and "multipolar" international system will survive. Will, for example, the United States, Japan, or Western Europe, as the world energy crisis worsens, remain indifferent to the vast untapped off-shore oil reserves in the Gulf of Siam, the South China Sea, or the inter-insular Philippine waters? Besides, North Vietnam and the Communist governments of Laos and Cambodia want nothing to do with ASEAN. Their particular conception of a neutralization of the region is one in which none of the present ASEAN governments would be permitted to survive. South Vietnam's reaction to the neutralization idea has been to the point: "We have become the victims of aggression and how can we be neutral?" Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam said in Djakarta last July after talks with his Indonesian opposite number on the subject. As for Burma, its rigid notion of neutrality does not even permit siding publicly with ASEAN's idea of it, though of late, as the European Common Market countries have increasingly begun dealing with the Southeast Asian region through ASEAN and its new permanent secretariat in Djakarta, trade necessity is forcing second thoughts in Rangoon.



Rather than promoting ASEAN as a "neutralized" entity, some Indonesian military commanders, more sensitive perhaps than their counterparts in other Southeast Asian capitals to the need for new security initiatives that encompass the region as a whole, have urged that the organization take steps to become a strong political and (in effect) pseudo-military consultative body and alliance as well. In the Philippines, where Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo has also long been insisting that Southeast Asia develop its own "collective strength" instead of counting on the good will of the major powers to leave the region alone in a presumably "neutralized" state, there has been quiet support for the Indonesian idea. But elsewhere, especially in Malaysia, some are convinced that an accommodation with People's China must be made, and others are equally certain that too strong an ASEAN, particularly a militarized one, would inevitably lead to sharp confrontation with Peking. This strong opposition has virtually killed the idea of a stronger ASEAN. For the same reason there have been no takers (least of all in Washington) for such blue-sky ideas as Lee Kuan Yew's suggestion last May that the United States, Japan, Australia, and some Western European powers establish a joint naval task force, stationed in Singapore, to help keep the peace in the region ("an obviously dissonant note," *Pravda* commented on May 13, 1973, attributable to "the provocative and subversive policies of Peking's leaders").

And so, caught between, on the one hand, the American retreat from Indochina and the grave debilitation of such erstwhile regional security mechanisms as SEATO (reeling under Pakistan's withdrawal, France's refusal to pay its customary contribution, and Australia's hostility to it) and, on the other hand, the hope that a condition of quiescent, near defencelessness will somehow persuade the major powers to leave the region alone, Southeast Asia searches for a format for regional security and domestic stability. There are few in the regions' capitals who have failed to note that the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho cease-fire agreements of 1973, coupled to the new U.S. drive for Chinese and Soviet cordiality, have, in effect, handed Peking and Moscow considerable veto power over future American retaliatory ability (even if the latter could get past the Congress). Neither the steady, "incremental" Communist conquest of Laos and Cambodia, nor the new threat this would pose to an already beleaguered Thailand, nor an escalation of the North Vietnamese effort to subjugate South Vietnam, nor, again, a weakening of the Marcos government in the Philippines in the face of both an outright Maoist insurgency in Luzon, and the Maoist infiltrated Muslim rebellion in Mindanao, would or could now provoke an effective U.S. reaction. The present writer knows of no one in Southeast Asia who believes that Moscow will somehow check Hanoi or Peking in their continuing attempts to subvert their neighbors. And can anyone envisage the Chinese forcibly (or otherwise) restraining the North Vietnamese from establishing their *de facto* satellites in Luang Prabang and Phnom Penh, or Hanoi preventing Peking from continuing to supply and train the Thai Communist movement as the latter steadily expands its operations and begins to engage the Thai Army in larger scale, set-piece battles, involving thousands on both sides?

Ideological and strategic splits in the Communist camp have somehow made little tactical difference to those in Southeast Asia confronted by domestic Communist subversion and external pressure. Early in 1973, for example, the *Chinese News Analysis* (Hong Kong, May 4, 1973, pp. 6–7) reported that despite their mutual ethnic

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and political suspicions, "common agreement" had been reached among North Koreans, Chinese, North Vietnamese, and the Communist forces in Cambodia and Laos, in respect to "treating the whole of Indochina as one common Communist cause." Recent Chinese editorials, as well as pronouncements by Prince Norodom Sihanouk in the North Korean capital, underscored this convergence which, certainly in a strategic sense, and so far as the remaining committed anti-Communists in the Southeast Asian region are concerned, is far more important than occasional outbursts of hostility between Cambodian Reds and their North Vietnamese allies over available supplies of rice at the front, or between the Pathet Lao and the underground Thai Communist movement over control over the Thai-Laotian border areas.

It is remarkable, then, that in some American quarters a return of Sihanouk to power in Phnom Penh is believed to be the only solution to Cambodia's problems. We have the Prince's own conviction on record that "Cambodia will become Communist, and it is only right that it become Communist because the revolution that the Khmer Rouge have made in the liberated areas [in Cambodia] has succeeded." The Communist forces in Cambodia (among them some 30,000 to 40,000 North Vietnamese) are not a homogeneous force to be sure. But of the ideological complexion of the regime they seek to establish, with or without Sihanouk, there can be little doubt. That a Peking which continues to proclaim that "We shall certainly liberate Taiwan," as well as urge the need for "complete victory" in the "national liberation" struggles of the Third World, will also persist in its policies to make that complexion conform to its interests is equally certain.

Meanwhile, in a United States weary of and sick at heart with its Vietnam venture, the "why die for Danzig" syndrome is now well in place, and its validity as policy can only be tested by the passage of time. There remains, however, one currently popular rationalization for this syndrome that needs to be disposed of in closing. Simply put, this is the argument that the United States had and has no business in Vietnam or Southeast Asia because what Americans presumably want for the region (freedom of political choice and expression, democratic elections, self-determination in modern nationhood, and so on), either was not understood, or was resented, or in any case was and is a matter of indifference to the inhabitants of the region. This, a more sophisticated version of the old argument that (1) there is a Southeast Asian—or Vietnamese, or Laotian, or Indonesian, etc. —"mind," and (2) that it is too mysterious to understand and, anyhow, ought not to

Buchanan: the Apodiabolosis that Failed

When the Watergate traveling tent revival meeting, still conducting faith healing down on Pennsylvania Avenue, suddenly invited Patrick Buchanan, the White House conservative, to the baptismal font, Buchanan was ready for them, although in this glorious age of due process he had received the barest possible notice. The tent revival was looking for sinners, and having run out of the third and fourth cousins of any principals in the Watergate affair, they fastened upon the President's conservative speechifier as one who had all sorts of sinful possibilities. As was their custom, they leaked a few mendacious stories to the press, by way of prelude, and then invited the sinner to defend himself.

Buchanan's response was not to dwell at length upon his innocence—although he pronounced it for the record—but rather he introduced the matter of *tu quoque*, or "you, too." Now in morals this is the weakest of defenses, but in politics it takes on a different nature. In politics the *tu quoque* has explosive power, especially in the milieu of a holy inquisition. And so, when the preachers of the Gospel of Political Virginity bored in on Buchanan, the feisty defender of the Nixon regime bored back, relentlessly reminding the preachers of their own dalliances. It was a performance so favorable to the Nixon Administration that the TV networks abruptly canceled further Watergate telecasts (alleging, of course, that they were now boring).

Mr. Buchanan readily acknowledged the moral weakness of the *tu quoque*: two wrongs don't make a right. But Buchanan had a powerful understanding of what such an argument achieves in a political arena. It is, after all, acutely embarrassing when a squalling victim is reminded that he himself is a famous victimizer. The tactic does not expiate guilt, but it pulls the accusers into the dock with the accused. Buchanan's technique was doubly effective because he actually was innocent, by all accounts, of the entire Watergate episode.

It was enough to arouse an American burgher to apoplexy, for there on his TV was a clearly innocent man in the hotseat, telling all the world that his accusers were by no means political virgins. The net effect of Buchanan's testimony was to restore sanity and moral order to the national consciousness; to drain away the revival-tent sanctimony of those pillars of pulchritude, Sam Dash, the Honorable Ervin, and the Connecticut Windtunnel. Buchanan separated political tactics into four categories ranging from the perfectly legal and ethical to the illegal and outrageous, thus lending proportion to the whole issue. Unlike the pragmatists of the Nixon regime (and the Kennedy and Johnson regimes before), Buchanan not only recognized a clear value system, but showed that he had lived by it as well.

In moral theory one makes distinctions between, say, hookers, mistresses, amateurs, the inexperienced, the wayward, the much-married, the married, the untempted, the raped, and the virgins. But up until Buchanan spoke, no one had made similar distinctions in the realm of politics, least of all the impresarios who, lacking all sense of gray, had divided the world into sinners and saints. Buchanan's contribution was to restore the grays; to say that, after all, subscribing to your opponent's mail list had no evil in it, but that phony letters aimed at dividing the opposition were worse, and that bugging or furtive character assassination were worse still. Thus he doused the whole sawdust-and-sweat road show in ice water. The preachers were chilled.

Even the Right Reverend Sam Dash met his match: "What tactics would I be willing to use? Anything that was not immoral, unethical, illegal, or *unprecedented in previous Democratic campaigns*," said Buchanan. *Tu quoque*!

Buchanan reminded the Lords Spiritual that in 1962 Democratic trickster Dick Tuck had bamboozled the engineer of the Nixon campaign train to chug off in the middle of a Nixonian homily. *Tu quoque*!

In 1968, Buchanan noted, Tuck had hired a group of pregnant blacks to parade before the GOP convention with posters saying "Nixon's the One." *Tu quoque*!

And when Buchanan was accused of the horrible felony of getting onto Democratic mailing lists, Buchanan shot back that the tactic was, after all, endorsed in Democratic Chairman O'Brien's campaign manual. *Tu quoque*!

And so in the end, a young conservative, hastily prepared, alone in the hotseat, and fighting calumnious advance leaks, without visible support from his august employer or his pragmatic minions, faced a battery of hanging judges, lascivious lawyers, and politicians whoring after power. He faced them alone with a clearer conscience than any of his accusers. And he carried the day.

Buchanan was something of a hero when he returned to the White House. Horatio had defended the bridge. But the valueless, pragmatic technicians of the Nixonian Era still do not understand the source of Buchanan's confidence. The fact that he is a principled man puts a great chasm between him and his colleagues (although he would surely protest such an assertion). But it is true, nonetheless, that Buchanan had within him through his entire service to Richard Nixon a clear inner vision that enabled him to draw the boundaries of honor and stay within them. He had, moreover, the maturity to recognize that all the dirty tricks in the world had upon the course of events no more than the weight of a feather. Buchanan's testimony marked the beginning of an important deflation of the whole Watergate embroglio, and a return to normalcy.

Richard Wheeler

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be tampered with by westerners, is encountered, for example, in the recently published study of the U.S. experience in Vietnam by Ms. Frances G. FitzGerald, entitled ***Fire in the Lake***. Throughout this volume runs a theme heard in a thousand Vietnam teach-ins of the past, namely that to the Vietnamese the making of choices among alternative forms of government, or of candidates for office, "appeared quite absurd," that because Vietnamese are allegedly more interested in the political mystique of the prevailing "will of Heaven," the proposition that voting in an election might actually change the character of government is "an almost impermissible" notion to them, that the democratic process of balancing out the different constituencies was and is not of interest to them, and so on.

All of this is nonsense, not only insofar as Vietnam is concerned, but also insofar as virtually all of the rest of Southeast Asia is concerned. To be sure, the elections that have been held in the past decade in South Vietnam (or in the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, etc.) have been marred by malversations at the ballot box (similar, say, to those in the 1960 presidential election tabulation in Cook County, Illinois), by poor voter turnouts ("Only 55.7 percent of all Americans old enough to be eligible to vote bothered to cast a vote for president" in 1972, Theodore H. White in his study of that election has observed), and by attempts to smear, embarrass, or obstruct opposition parties and candidates (Watergate, anyone?). But this is not the same thing as saying that to the Vietnamese, or to others in Southeast Asia, making political choices is either absurd, or incomprehensible, or "impermissible." A brief glance at the sophisticated powerplays between President Thieu and his opponents in the South Vietnamese parliament, at the alignment and realignment of political parties in Indonesia, at the lively voter appreciation of ethnic and other pluralistic constituency-balancing in elections in Malaysia and Singapore, or at the formation and expression of political opposition to the Marcos government in the Philippines, will soon convince one that it isn't. "To deny the Vietnamese the right of choice by denying that they want it, would be the last disservice the Americans could perform for that unfortunate people," Brian Beedham in his critique of the FitzGerald book has written. Just so, and Beedham's remark well applies to the whole of Southeast Asia as it seeks to survive in the Nixonian "peace in our time." □

A. Lawrence Chickering

The California Welfare Reforms of 1971

Background

In March 1971 Governor Reagan submitted to the California legislature the most comprehensive welfare reform legislation in the history of the state. Against the vigorous opposition of the welfare lobby, by early August the Democratic legislature passed more than 70 percent of the Governor's proposals, and on August 13, 1971, the California Welfare Reform Act of 1971 became law.

The background of the reforms can be found in the nation-wide welfare explosion that began in the mid-sixties. A few numbers will recall the extent of the problem. Between 1961 and 1971, while the population of the United States grew 11 percent, the number of AFDC recipients rose 216 percent, from 3.2 to 10.2 million (Roger A. Freeman, Testimony before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, January 27, 1972, p. 3). Between 1964 and 1971, the total number of welfare recipients rose from 7.7 million to 14.4 million, from an annual cost of $5 billion to $18 billion.

The situation in California was deteriorating even more rapidly than in the rest of the country. In March 1961, California had 620,000 welfare recipients. Ten years later, when the Governor submitted his proposals, the caseload had grown to 2.3 million: at a time when the state economy was booming, for several years California's welfare caseload had been growing at a rate of 40,000 per month, and there were signs the rate of growth was increasing (in fiscal year 1968–1969, the annual growth rate increased from a range of 8–13 percent to a peak of 24 percent in 1970–71).

The reasons for the welfare boom have been widely debated. In California, the level of welfare payments cannot have been to blame, because real benefits in the state did not increase at all between 1960 and 1969 (cf. Edward C. Banfield, "Welfare: A Crisis without 'Solutions'," *Public Interest*, Summer 1969).

More likely, the problem was caused by evangelistic welfare bureaucrats, assisted by the 1967 federal welfare regulation amendments. Continuing the momentum of the civil rights movement and the war on poverty, welfare workers set about to sell the glories of life on the dole and thereby recruited recipients, who, though legally entitled to receive benefits, had not previously received them. Chief intellectual inspiration for the effort came from the Columbia School of Social Work, where Professors Cloward and Piven were arguing that the welfare system was a plot against the poor and that the only hope for genuine "reform" lay in overloading the rolls and breaking the system (Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, ***Regulating the Poor*** [New York, Random House], 1971).

If this position seemed perverse to some people, it nevertheless reflected a national change in attitude toward welfare. By the end of the sixties the media had us thinking in terms of welfare "*rights*," and the National Welfare Rights Association for a short while became a major dispenser of wisdom on social matters. Reflecting the trend, by the end of the sixties, the courts were striking down as "discriminatory" regulations limiting eligibility and expanding rights to eligibility where they had not existed before.

In any event, in his message to the legislature, Governor Reagan warned that without reform of the laws, the rolls could reach three million in California by July 1972. The California Department of Social Welfare had estimated that without reform, the total welfare cost—for federal, state, and county governments—could exceed $3 billion during the coming fiscal year.

The choice was rather simple: either the system was reformed to bring the situation under control, or it would overwhelm the state budget. Without reform, it would be impossible to avoid either massive tax increases or reduction of other state services or both. Public support for reform was increased by frequent news stories of widespread abuses and fraud in the system.

In August 1970, the Governor appointed a special task force to study all aspects of the problem and recommend a total strategy for addressing it. Staffed by key members of his administration, the task force conducted over 700 in-depth interviews with federal, state, and county officials, systematically reviewed federal and state laws and regulations, and studied the organizational and fiscal dimensions of the problem.

The task force completed its work in December and submitted its recommendations to the Governor and the Director of Social Welfare (DSW). In only three months, the task force had uncovered massive abuses in the welfare system, which were hurting both taxpayers and those recipients whose need was real. The need for reform was dramatized by one Oakland woman whose $14,000 annual income somehow still did not prevent her being on the rolls.

The task force set forth six overall objectives, which became the basis of the Governor's program. They included controlling the overall cost of welfare, reducing the rolls to the truly needy, reforming county and state administrations, requiring those able to work to do so, increasing assistance to the truly needy, and strengthening family responsibility.

The first stage of reform began almost immediately. In January 1971 the Governor appointed a new secretary to the Human Relations Agency, which coordinates all of the state social service departments, and a new director to the State Department of Social Welfare. Their job was to help develop legislative reforms and implement a large number of administra-

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tive reforms, which could be undertaken immediately.

The Reforms

The strategy called for reform of both the welfare system and the state's Medi-Cal system, which was available to all welfare recipients. Potential political obstacles in both Sacramento and Washington were substantial. To accomplish the administrative reforms, the Governor needed the cooperation of HEW to grant waivers of federal regulations in a number of areas. In Sacramento, the problem was potentially worse, as liberal Democrats controlled both houses of the state legislature.

There is no space here to examine the entire range of administrative and legislative reforms that were proposed and implemented. The magnitude of the effort is suggested by the size of the Governor's reform message, which consisted of 175 pages, seventy major provisions, and scores of subprovisions. The overall objective was to increase grants to the truly needy, while reducing grants to all others.

The most controversial (and interesting) measures were those designed to reduce the number of recipients and grant amounts. These measures fell into three general categories: eligibility restrictions, the work requirement, and the measures relating to child support and family responsibility.

Under the old system, the state had no effective way of ensuring uniform rules of eligibility, because the counties had sole responsibility for making eligibility determinations. Today the counties determine eligibility under contract with the state, under regulations that have been revised and clarified.

Part of the eligibility problem was aggravated by the 1967 federal work incentive amendments. Before 1967, for every dollar he earned, a welfare recipient was subject to a reduction of his welfare payments by a like amount. The 1967 amendments had a worthy objective: to meet the problem of incentives wrought by this 100 percent tax. For that reason they exempted from the reduction the first $30 of earnings, plus one-third of everything above $30. In addition, the changes exempted a whole series of work-related expenses ("disregards"), including child care, transportation, and so on.

However noble the purpose of the amendments, they offered an immediate opportunity for many previously-ineligible employed people to go on welfare. In practice, welfare workers began applying the disregards to determine eligibility—thereby violating the spirit of the amendments, which sought to encourage people to work their way off the rolls, not to open new opportunities to get on.

Once on the rolls, a recipient became entitled not only to the cash grant, but also to Medi-Cal, free lunches, and food stamps. It was little wonder that the task force turned up resourceful people who were doing a lot better on welfare than they could off it.

Much of the problem was solved by separating the determination of eligibility from the judgment about the amount of the grant. The process was assisted by tightening regulations on work-related expenses, and by state responsibility for training special eligibility workers, who are kept separate from professional social workers.

The work requirement further restricted eligibility. Prior to the reforms, eligibility bore little relation to employment. The new work requirement established the principle that those who could work must at least be looking for work if they want to receive welfare.

In determining eligibility, those who are unemployable because of age, physical handicap, and need in the home, remain under the jurisdiction of the county welfare departments and receive full aid through the established programs.

Those who are declared employable are placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Human Resources Development (HRD), which helps them find work. If no job is available, they are referred for training to a program such as the Work Incentive Program (WIN). If no training is available, the recipient must participate in Community Work Experience Projects (CWEP) and give a maximum of eighty hours a month to a community work project, while continuing to look for permanent employment with HRD social workers, who are specially trained for that purpose.

The third general measure designed to tighten eligibility seeks to strengthen family responsibility through contributions for child support. The problem occurs in AFDC, where most of the welfare caseload is located and where the bulk of the increases came in the sixties. Under California law, the absent parent must contribute to the support of the child, but he almost never does. In one study of the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1969–70, 17.6 percent of the absent parents contributed an average of $74.95 for support. The average payment should have been $129 for an average 2.3 children (This latter figure of $129 employs the standards of the Los Angeles County Welfare Department).

In the past, social workers had been extremely reluctant to refer cases of nonsupport to law enforcement officials. Reorienting them to consider child support a law enforcement function has been a major problem.

In the past, counties had little economic incentive to pursue collections: they contributed only 16 percent of AFDC monies, while the cost of collection ranged from 10–15 percent. The 1971 reforms have radically changed the incentives. Today the state provides a considerable economic incentive for the counties to pursue collections, by offering a cash incentive bringing the county's interest up to 37.25 percent. The new system is already showing significant improvements: in one year, collections doubled over the preceding year, and Sacramento County showed the full dimensions of opportunity when, thanks to state reimbursements, its Domestic Relations Department began running at a profit.

Results and Conclusions

It is still too early to give definite conclusions about the effects of the 1971 reforms. Many of the changes are still not fully implemented. Even for the results we have, it is difficult to know which reforms produced which results.

Nevertheless, the numbers alone leave no doubt the reforms have been a spectacular success. For comparison: before the reforms there were 2.3 million welfare recipients in California—one out of every nine in the state. For several years, the rolls had been growing at a rate of more than 40,000 per month, and by mid-1972 they were expected to reach three million, at a cost of $3 billion.

The administrative reforms went into effect on March 1, 1971, and the legislation followed on October 1. By October 1972, there were 253,000 fewer recipients on the welfare rolls than there had been eighteen months earlier, and *three-quarters of a million* fewer than had been projected without the reforms. The downward trend has continued steadily into the middle of 1973. In July 1973, the rolls were declining at a rate of 10–15,000 per month and were down to 1.94 million. In addition, the total cost of welfare had been reduced from $2.5 billion to $1.96 billion. Compared to the projected cost without reform, by mid-1973 the annual savings had reached $1 billion.

Contributors

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Best of all, while other states (e.g., New Jersey and Kansas) were cutting back welfare outlays across the board, the California reforms permitted the state to increase substantially (by an average 27 percent) grants to those remaining on the rolls who genuinely needed help.

The dollar savings to the state and counties have been substantial. In fiscal year 1971–72 the state of California spent $352 million less for welfare than had been projected, and by the end of 1972 nearly three-quarters of the state's fifty-eight counties had reduced their property taxes.

California's experience has caused me to doubt the viability of the negative income tax as a means of welfare reform. There are two possible approaches to the rationing problem: one minimizes distinctions between different classes of welfare recipients, by treating those who can work the same as those who cannot. It either allows those who can work to receive welfare as a matter of right (FAP and the negative income tax), or of practice (the present welfare system). Without rationing by need, it must set low levels of payment to all recipients, for the system will only tolerate so much relief.

The alternative, best represented by the present (reformed) California system, makes a sharp distinction between those who genuinely need help and those who do not. The experience in California affirms the practicality of rationing by need—which seems a far more equitable system than those that depend on severe across-the-board limits on the size of the grants. □

Ernest van den Haag

Everybody Above Average

The recent problems of higher education spring from educational inflation. An unprecedentedly high proportion of the college-age group—more than 40 percent—now attends college. This is double the proportion of twenty years ago. The expansion has been incredibly rapid. Faculties, of course, were inflated in the same proportion. The result is that far more professors teach and do research than are competent to do either, and far more students attend than could benefit—even if they were taught by competent professors.

The prolongation of schooling for four years—more in many cases—for nearly half the age group, is not justified by the returns. Only about 25 percent of the college-age group have the IQ (110) required by previous standards to benefit from college education. Fewer still have the disposition to listen to lectures for four more years after being compelled to do so for twelve. As for instructors, an IQ of 140 was once thought necessary. There is reason to believe that the IQ of most is now below that.

Since more than 40 percent of the age group now attend college, and only 25 percent have the required IQ, a significant number cannot benefit unless the curriculum is adapted to their understanding, i.e., degraded. This is being done successfully. Whereas the unadapted curriculum teaches much to students who learn little, the adapted curriculum teaches little to students who learn little. There is a psychological advantage, but in neither case do the returns justify the additional schooling. The students are right then in claiming that college education is often irrelevant to them. It will remain so as long as students who are manifestly irrelevant to college education are admitted.

The easiest way to deal with the problem is to hide it, by giving higher grades for lower achievement. This is done. Another way of dealing with the problem is to institute "relevant" courses—relevant not to cognitive knowledge, but to headlines and the—often iatrogenic—psychological problems which the students suffer. Thus, colleges offer "encounter workshops" in which students try to find their identity, of which the attempt to master alien ideas has robbed them.

But even encounters and high grades may not suffice to restore the students' identity and prestige in their own eyes. Prestige is all too easily lost in unsuccessful attempts to master intellectual disciplines. Many students, therefore, are tempted to regain it by playing the role of revolutionaries, rebels against authority, in the psychodrama for which the university has allowed itself to be used as a stage setting.

Whence the educational inflation with its attending evils? Why is it difficult even for bright students now to accept the authority of *alma mater* or, indeed, any authority?

Colleges are non-profit organizations. Nonetheless, faculties and administrations make their living through them, and that living tends to be better, the greater the total attendance. Promotion and pay largely, if indirectly, depend on enrollments. This is one reason why colleges have attempted all too successfully to expand continuously over the last twenty years—with the results about which they now wonder. Since their product (knowledge) is irrelevant or inabsorbable to many of its consumers, colleges had to diversify and offer courses relevant to the students they have enticed, if not to higher learning.

There is nothing wrong with letting anyone who wishes attend college courses whenever possible. It is wrong, however, to promise a degree when not warranted by expected achievement, and even more wrong to give it—whether or not the nonachievement is disguised by ungraded courses, or grade inflation, or courses in education, or in baking bread, or in other subjects which, whatever their importance, cannot be taught profitably because they lack cognitive content and are irrelevant to the activities for which they are supposed to prepare.

Yet the demand for college education is by no means wholly contrived, even if the colleges are guilty of complicity and instigation. We live in a society that believes (1) that opportunity ought to be equal for all; (2) that equal opportunity will make for equal results; (3) that equal education equalizes opportunity and thus, ultimately, results. However doubtful their validity, these propositions are widely accepted, and because they are, the idea is widespread that everybody ought to have a college education, and would benefit from it—regardless of his capacity or previous school record. College is thought to equalize capacities. Differences in past records are thought to have been produced by different opportunities—not by different inherent capacities or inclinations. This idea was bound to lead to "open admissions," i.e., admission for credit of students who have given no indication of a capacity to profit from college education.

One argument in favor of open admissions is that, after all, those who prove incapable will be dropped for unsatisfactory grades. But in practice instructors hardly ever give failing grades to a majority, or even a plurality of students in their classes. They are afraid of being blamed for the students' failing and they don't want to be unpopular. The administration thinks of students as consumers: the product must be adapted. Anyway, it would upset the arrangement to do otherwise. Hence, the result of open admissions is not *post facto* selection, but grade inflation and lower standards. (Students drop out anyway—but because of boredom rather than low grades.)

Open admissions often are also justified as acts of corrective justice to disadvantaged minorities—as though the function of colleges were to equalize social disadvantages rather than to educate. Educating requires learning as well as teaching. If the ability to learn is excluded as admissions criterion, education is not likely to succeed. In the process of attempting to educate the inept, the education of those who might benefit will necessarily be impaired, while very little is gained by those who are supposed to be helped. Instructors are unlikely to present materials from which the gifted can benefit when the rest of the class would be unable to follow. The materials they end up presenting do not amount to a college education.

Sometimes open admissions are justified by stressing that in the past the offspring of the nobility was admitted even when unfit. This was indeed done. It was thought that the students admitted would occupy important and powerful social positions, independently of whether they went to college. Hence, it was better to educate them to whatever degree they were capable of being educated. This reasoning cannot apply to present open admissions policies. The students admitted would not have occupied positions of leadership automatically and independently of their education. If they do at all it will be because of their college degrees which—the symbol being confused with what it symbolizes—are

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taken as proof of education. If, on the other hand, the alumnus does not "make it" by virtue of his education, what the college has created is ambition untethered to possibility—an unhappy person likely to hold society responsible for his frustration and who, therefore, will be harmful to it.

What can be done? The educational inflation could not occur without the cooperation of colleges. It is, on the whole, within their power to stop it. They could limit admissions and rededicate themselves to cognitive learning at the college level. The best people that can be found should be selected as students and professors, regardless of race, religion, or sex, or anything else, except for those dispositions of character that make a person capable of living in an intellectual community and make it possible later as well to benefit from having lived and learned there. No more than 35 percent of the college age group should study for degrees and faculties should be reduced accordingly.

Colleges have played a decisive role in creating educational inflation, and they could stop it. However, industry, labor, and the government have connived. And there have been ideological misapprehensions. Many Americans believe in education as they used to believe in religion. They are convinced that attending college must be good and can do no harm, as they were convinced that attending church is helpful and never harmful. But education can be harmful if it is transformed into schooling, over-extended, and imposed on those who are not able to benefit, by those not able to educate. The very word "education" here helps to mislead people since it conflates the process of being educated—which may or may not succeed—with its successful accomplishment or product.

Labor all too often welcomes education to keep people out of the labor market as long as possible. "Education" is the cheapest way (for the unions) of doing so. The government has found it easier to yield to the pressure which industry has not opposed. Education transfers much of the cost of apprenticeship to the taxpayer—even if it is a comparatively inefficient way, in many cases, of preparing for the business at hand. Last, though not least, business has used degrees, however irrelevant to the tasks at hand, as a sifting device in hiring. Yet in many cases the preference for college graduates is irrational. Such a preference should be regarded as "discriminatory," in the invidious sense, whenever the college education has no demonstrable relevance to the job to be filled. To demand that an applicant have a college education (when it is not relevant) is discrimination just as an irrelevant preference for race or religion is: irrelevant discrimination in terms of educational credentials ought to be prohibited legally just as racial discrimination is. Selection on any basis other than the qualities relevant to the job is "discrimination" and should be made unlawful. It matters not at all whether the selective process is meant to irrelevantly exclude or include groups (sexual, racial, religious, educational) in any proportion, including the proportion in which they occur in the total population. The latter irrelevant—and unconstitutional—inclusion is now sponsored as "affirmative action" by, yes, the federal government. So much the worse for the federal government.

Parents, finally, cannot escape a share of the blame for the present situation. Many students reach higher education without ever having been led to accept the authority of persons or institutions, and without having been asked to do anything requiring a major effort. This is why many talented students find it difficult to accept intellectual discipline, and to accept the authority of those who profess and transmit it. Authority can be transferred to those who stand *in loco parentis* only if there is parental authority to be transferred. Many students never have experienced it, and therefore find it hard to accept the authority of the law and the university.

Rehabilitation will be hard for them, for society, and for the universities. But it is not fostered by refusals to exercise authority and by acceptance of anyone and anything. Universities must become selective in what and how they teach, in hiring and keeping professors, and in admitting students. □

Of Ex-Veeps and New Veeps

(WASHINGTON)—That was a week, that was! Vice-President Agnew resigned, pleaded no contest to an income tax evasion charge, was fined $10,000, and received three years of unsupervised probation. U.S. District Court Judge, Walter Hoffman, called the (former) Vice-President's no contest plea the full equivalent of a guilty plea. Thus ended what had promised to become another log cabin American success story. From poor boy to Baltimore County Executive, from Maryland Governor to Vice-President (Spiro who?) of the United States, Agnew's political future once seemed limitless.

Continuing Bitterness

In what was billed as his final television speech to the nation, the (former) Vice-President reasserted his innocence and indicated that his resignation was not "an admission of guilt, but a plea of no contest, done to quell the raging storm." And although Agnew had only the highest praise for President Nixon (and his vice-presidential nominee, Gerald Ford) during his television speech, in an earlier interview with the *Nashville Banner*, Agnew stated that intense pressure from the highest levels of the Nixon Administration had forced him to resign. Agnew thus failed to still what many see as the continuing bitterness among Agnew partisans over the former Vice-President's being hounded out of office by "Nixonites."

Vic Gold, Agnew's former press aide turned syndicated Washington columnist, and *Washington Post* journalist David Broder, were on CBS immediately after the Vice-President's speech for one of those instant analysis sessions the Vice-President had so often criticized. Neither Gold nor Broder had much to say, except that they were "confused"; and Gold, to his credit, stated that these instant analysis sessions serve little purpose. (Gold had also reportedly jumped out of his chair when Agnew had praised the President for the support he had given to him.)

What Is the Lesson?

The events which forced the Vice-President to resign are undoubtedly both a personal and a national tragedy. What apparently had begun as an anonymous phone call to the Internal Revenue Service about political graft and corruption in Baltimore County (a long-time Democratic stronghold) quickly mushroomed beyond what anyone had really expected. The victim of this investigation has, in fact, been the Vice-President, and not the Maryland Democratic Party. And for those who know Maryland politics, this is an irony which has not gone unnoticed.

For our politicians and our social pundits there could be no more opportune time for the July Fourth rhetoric which usually accompanies such events. But the true tragedy is that while many will speak of the moral code elected officials should live by, not all will believe their own eloquent hot air, and even fewer will live up to it.

Now is the time for everyone to quote Lord Acton's perennial truism that "all power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." But what is the lesson? I guess it's that they just don't make things like they used to, including party machines. As Plunkitt of Tammany Hall observed, good politics means loyalty, all the way to the prison gates.

Successor Named

With the Vice-President's resignation the debate quickly focused upon who would be nominated as his successor. The Democrats, in a true spirit of reconciliation, promised Nixon hell's fire if he attempted to

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nominate an aspiring 1976 presidential candidate. Few expected Nixon to listen to the threats of the Democrats. Indeed, when Nixon requested Republican leaders from around the country, as well as the GOP House and Senate members, to submit nominations for potential candidates, few expected this to be more than an exercise in public relations.

House Minority Leader, Jerry Ford, was the overwhelming favorite (reportedly by a margin of two to one) of congressional Republicans for the vice-presidential nomination. To the surprise of many (even though Ford had been widely rumored to be the frontrunner and the entire Michigan congressional delegation had been invited to the White House nominating ceremony that night), Nixon did nominate Ford, but it is a choice that is not so surprising. Ford was first elected to Congress in 1948 and he is considered to be a "close" friend of Nixon's (he has been an unswerving Nixon Loyalist). Nixon reportedly wanted Ford as his running mate in 1960, but Henry Cabot Lodge with the support of President Eisenhower was able to prevail and get the vice-presidential nomination in that year. Jerry Ford, like Senator Dole of Kansas had done as Chairman of the Republican National Committee, had worked hard for his fellow Republican colleagues. He spoke for them in their districts and he helped them raise money. As House Minority Leader, Ford had performed remarkably well, considering what a few Republicans have called the "creeping CREEPism" syndrome of the Administration.

Many Republicans have applauded Ford's nomination because they fear that the worst is not yet over for Nixon. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ordered the President to hand over his White House taped telephone conversations (a decision which Nixon will appeal before the Supreme Court). There is also the question of the $100,000 Howard Hughes contribution to Nixon (through his long-time associate Rebozo) which has yet to be traced and explained, and some suspect it was used for personal benefit. Consequently, many GOP officials wanted someone who would receive approval quickly so that in case of presidential impeachment the presidency would not fall by default to Democratic House Speaker Carl Albert. Another fear expressed (unofficially) was that any person who joined the Nixon team would be irreparably tainted and thus would have election problems in 1976. Ford, a somewhat colorless but loyal Party figure, seems to be the best solution to both problems and thus satisfies many Republicans. For reasons of their own, Democrats too are elated. One Democratic congressional aide gleefully stated that had House Majority Leader Tip O'Neill (D-Mass.) orchestrated the effort to nominate the Vice-President, the Democrats could not have hoped for a better choice than Jerry Ford.

Cynicism Remains

Nixon's choice, nonetheless, raises serious questions. Even though many congressional Republicans had listed Ford as their first choice, and highly regarded as he might be, many others—perhaps most—would have preferred someone else. These Republican officials complain quietly that Nixon could have better satisfied the needs of the country and the Party by appointing someone of Senator Goldwater's stature, even Senator Baker or GOP National Committee Chairman, George Bush. The list, of course, was endless, and there was also strong support for Governors Reagan and Rockefeller.

These same officials discount the White House's targeted "leaks" which seemed to indicate that the President chose Ford so as not to divide the Republican Party (or even the country). They further doubt that Ford's nomination came in response to congressional pressure and discount the White House line that the President wants to remain neutral in the 1976 GOP presidential nominating process. The White House position is being met with such cynicism for the following reasons: Two weeks before Vice-President Agnew resigned, Nixon was already running security checks. Nixon chose Gerald Ford only after Attorney General Richardson withdrew himself from consideration (a politically adroit move for a man who probably plans to run for public office in Massachusetts). Nixon also withdrew John Connally's name from consideration after the former Texas Governor had pointed to the battle Nixon could expect from both Republicans and Democrats in Congress. The President, however, was apparently confident that he had the votes to get Connally nominated and he is reported to have been more than willing to force a congressional showdown. (The President's serious consideration of Richardson is also regarded by some GOP officials as indicative of Nixon's continuing insensitivity to the Republican Party's right wing.)

The White House is not the most cheerful place in Washington today and Jerry Ford's nomination has done little to change the mood decisively one way or the other. □

Karl A. Wittfogel

Social Revolution in China

The following essay is a slightly edited version of a lecture given at the Australian National University in Canberra. Included in the lecture are certain passages from Karl A. Wittfogel's book, Oriental Despotism ***(Yale, 1957).***

The modern Chinese revolution had its start in the Nationalists' attempt early in the twentieth century to replace China's traditional government and society by a pluralistic institutional structure of the western type. This attempt was deficient in numerous ways, but it aimed at what the Marxists call a "democratic" revolution. After a few decades of political supremacy, the Nationalists in the late forties were ousted by the forces of the Communist revolution.

The Communist revolution was expected to advance from a Communist-dominated "bourgeois-democratic" revolution to a "socialist" revolution as defined by Lenin and his followers. Measured by its own criteria, it was eminently successful. But what did it accomplish in terms of the criteria of the classical analysts of history and society, criteria that in large part were also upheld by Karl Marx? What was the character of the order that had existed at the start of the Chinese Nationalist revolution? And what was the character of the order that came into being through the Communist revolution?

Aware that Marxism is the *lingua Franca* of most of the intellectuals who today promote societal change I would like to stress the Marxist approach to these problems. Marx's views on history and society largely continue the classical macro-analytic tradition; and in this respect Marxism proper is more realistic (and *classical*) than non-Marxist critics tend to recognize. However, changes that have been made in the classical substance of original Marxism to serve political purposes are scientifically untenable.

Some of the most important features of the resulting *orthodox* position are due to Marx himself. But Marx cannot be held responsible for all the ideas that Kautsky, Plekhanov, and Lenin have presented as orthodox. Some of them do reproduce Marx's classical and orthodox views, some do not. Moreover, Marx cannot be held responsible for the crude simplification of his ideas that has often, and properly, been referred to as "vulgar Marxism." And he certainly cannot be held responsible for the deliberate perversion of his ideas that, in analogy to one of his favorite pejorative designations, "*lumpen* proletariat," may be called "*lumpen* Marxism."

Among the various reproductions of Marx's concepts of society and history, *lumpen* Marxism appeared already in the writings of Lenin. It crucially affected the socio-historical views of Lenin's supposedly orthodox followers. Implicit in all their presentations is the admission that nothing is more dangerous to the power and prestige of the Communist regime in Russia (and in China) than the application of mature Marxian concepts of Asiatic society and Oriental despotism to their "socialist" societies.

In 1842/43, and stimulated by his work at the *Rheinische Zeitung*, Marx became increasingly interested in certain realistic elements of Hegel's philosophy. At this time he indicated his awareness of the fact that in Asia there existed a peculiar type of despotism. Hegel's concept of Asiatic despotism, it will be remembered, involved the idea that the huge Asiatic world had not shared in the western development but that, speaking socio-historically, it had stood still.

When the revolution of 1848/1849 failed, the continental period of Marx's activity as

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a revolutionary thinker and strategist came to an end. In 1852, most of his energies were spent in assisting the defendants in the Cologne Communist trial; and in November of that year he brought about the dissolution of the Marxist branch of the Communist League. In 1853, he resumed from a new vantage point his economic and socio-historical studies. It was then that, aided by Engels and generalizing mainly on the basis of his knowledge of India, he rediscovered the world of Asia whose peculiarity he had recognized in 1842/43, but then without concern for its ecological and economic peculiarities.

Now he pointed to certain definite ecological peculiarities: "vast sandy tracts of desert" plus a considerable supply of water that could be used for irrigation. And he pointed to certain definite economic-political peculiarities that were apt to develop in such an ecological setting: the need for the "economical and common use of water," which under Oriental conditions necessitated "the interference of the centralizing power of government."

Leaving many aspects of "Asia's" ecological and economic peculiarities unspecified, Marx expressed the conviction that the public-works government he had in mind possessed a despotic power which did not exist in other stratified agrarian societies. In his concept of the "Asiatic state" he stressed two crucial "circumstances": that the socio-historical fate of all "Oriental peoples" was determined (1) by the fact that the great public works were handled by "the central government," the public works in question being essentially "canals and waterworks"; and (2) by the fact that the people were "dispersed . . . over the surface of the country and agglomerated in small [village] centers by the domestic union of agricultural and manufacturing pursuits."

Marx obviously considered the first circumstance decisive for the origin of the Orientally despotic order and the second sufficient for its perpetuation: "These idyllic village communities . . . have always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism" (*New York Daily Tribune*, June 25, 1853). From 1853, he considered Tsarist Russia (which possessed only the second of the two circumstances) a semi-Asiatic society dominated by a full-fledged Orientally despotic government. From the later fifties he recognized that the dispersed villages of the Asiatic world were not necessarily based on communal land tenure. But he did not believe that abandonment of the communal village system destroyed "the economic foundation of Asiatic production" (*Das Kapital*, vol. III).

What accounts for the extraordinary staying power of the agro-managerial state? What caused its subjects to behave as they did? Unfortunately, these questions are still with us. Hence it would be well to recall Marx's answers to them, answers that are both timely and less well-known than the much advertised new interest in Marxism would lead us to expect.

Marx and Engels were, of course, not the first to note that "Oriental peoples" exhibited a slave-like submissiveness. The concept of political slavery was postulated already in classical Greece; and Montesquieu elaborated it more than a century before Marx coined the designation "general slavery." But Marx gave the concept a new quality by stressing the institutional conditions that had produced this type of behavior. The rural centers in which "the Oriental peoples" lived were "dispersed," "disconnected atoms" that isolated them physically and intellectually. This condition "restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass," depriving it of "all grandeur and historical energies." That is, the mass of the Oriental toilers did not participate by means of a politically-oriented struggle in the process of historical change. Their world condemned them to a plant-like "vegetative" and "passive" existence. They either sat by apathetically when military and political turmoil swirled around them, or they evoked "wild, aimless, unbounded forces of destruction."

Asiatic society, as Marx saw it, lacked the socio-economic "self-transforming" forces that in the societies of the West were conducive to politically-oriented social (class) struggle and social revolution. Marx was deeply convinced that this was the case. In 1853 he asserted that "the only *social* revolution ever heard of in Asia" occurred in India when "British interference" broke up the "economic basis" of Asiatic society (*New York Daily Tribune, op. cit.*).

From Marx's point of view the vision of a huge world that knew neither social revolution nor class struggle has a Dantesque quality. Recognizing that from 1853 this was Marx's and Engels' belief, we are struck by the fact that they did not, in subsequent prefaces of the *Communist Manifesto*, correct their original thesis regarding the universality of class struggle. This omission together with Marx's 1859 inclusion of the Asiatic order as one of four "progressive" epochs "in the economic formation of society" have served the cause, not of truth-oriented science, but of power-oriented "orthodox" Marxism.

But while Marx avoided identifying the lack of social revolution in Asia when he made programmatic political and theoretical statements, he was not equally evasive elsewhere. His changing evaluation of the Taiping Rebellion showed him willing to learn, not only about Asia, but also, and quite concretely, about China too.

In 1850, during the parochial period of his development, Marx welcomed the unfolding Taiping uprising as a movement that might establish a republic with the slogan "*Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*." Envisaging the Taiping Rebellion as capable of such an intent, he expected from it "the most significant results for civilization." But after taking a new look at Asia, Marx judged the Chinese potential for social revolution very differently. He spoke of the world of China as "completely Oriental" (1853), and he found that China's rural economy was even more resistant to change than was India's (1859). In 1862, at the close of the Taiping Rebellion, he stated that this formidable uprising had occurred in an "Oriental empire" and that it followed a definitely Oriental pattern: "The Oriental empires manifest a permanent immobility in the social infrastructure (*Unterbau*) and restless change among the persons and tribes that seize the political superstructure (*Ueberbau*)." Obviously mindful of the social revolutions of the West with their political tasks and slogans, he declared that the Taipings were "unaware of any task except the change of the dynasty." And mindful of the slogans cited by some missionaries as indicative of the aims of the Taipings—slogans which he did not take seriously—Marx asserted that the Taipings "have no slogans. . . . In the face of the conservative marasmus [of the existing regime] their own destiny seems to be destruction in grotesquely abhorrent forms, destruction without the creation of anything new" (*Die Presse*, Vienna, July 7, 1862).

Thus Marx denied the existence of a politically-oriented social struggle in Asiatic society. He denied it not only in 1853 when he recognized only its overall structure, but also in the sixties when he became aware of important substructural details, among them, the establishment of private land-ownership in China. The crucial India-China passage in the manuscript of the third volume of *Das Kapital* (which probably was written in 1864/65) underscores this latter fact. The Asiatic argument in the chapter on the division of labor in *Das Kapital*, vol. I (1867) shows that his newly acquired insights did not induce him to modify his earlier belief that the dissolution and reforming of states and the dynastic changes occurred in "the political skies" of Asiatic society, that is, in a sphere far above the unchanging and apathetic villages.

Obviously, class struggle is the luxury of multi-centered and open societies. Marx implies this in arguments that remain valid in substance although they are simplistic in form. The evidence of thousands of years of history confirms the contention that Asiatic society did not develop internal forces strong enough to cause the disintegration of this closed and single-centered society.

This is the first point to be made by the realistic student of social revolution in China. Like other Asiatic societies, China did not possess the internal forces to initiate such a transformation. Far from eliminating the system of "political" or "general" slavery, the changes that occurred in the substructure of Chinese society only made this system more complex and more flexible.

Under these circumstances, what manner of forces could initiate such a transformation? This question leads us to the second point in our inquiry. Again we will do well to inform ourselves regarding Marx's views on this issue, since his approach to social change led him to pose the question in greater institutional depth than had his predecessors.

Not a few macro-analysts who recognized the stationary character of Asiatic society were satisfied with the assertion that the "civilized" (the modern industrial) nations would somehow induce the rest of the world to follow their example. From 1845 Marx had been analyzing societal developments from an economic standpoint, but during his parochial period he argued them without being aware of possible diversities: "By the rapid improvement of all means of production, by the infinitely facilitated means of communication, the bourgeoisie pulls all, even the most barbarian nations, into civi-

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lization" (*The Communist Manifesto*). From 1853, he recognized the institutional peculiarity of the Orientally despotic order. The Asiatic countries he observed changed their societal identity only when modern industrial nations cracked down on them violently. These assaults might have different forms:

(1) Crushing military defeats by an industrial power might lead to the colonization of the defeated Asiatic country.

(2) Grave military defeats, while not leading to the colonization of the defeated country, might shatter its socio-political structure.

(3) Military defeats by several modern powers might lead to an inconclusive (semi-) colonization that lacked the strength and the purposefulness of a full-fledged colonization.

In China (type 3), the disintegration of the old economic-political order was proceeding during Marx's time very slowly. In Russia (type 2), the Crimean War was, according to Marx, the starting point for the disintegration of the old semi-Asiatic order. In India (type 1), the dominance of industrial capitalism (the "millocracy") eventually gave British rule a progressive quality, accomplishing, in fact, a nonwestern variant of a bourgeois revolution.

Marx argued further that the British conquest of India differed from conquests by "the Turk" and "the Persian" (both Turkey and Persia were, of course, Asiatic) and by "the Russian" (in 1853 Russia was still an intact semi-Asiatic country). The non-British conquests, he held, constituted a type of action that "did not go deeper than its surface," and the first phases of the British conquest did not go beyond the rule of the Dutch in Java. In both instances, the European masters planted a "European despotism" upon an "Asiatic despotism." In the Dutch instance, the European rulers "employed the existing machinery of despotism" to squeeze the native population even more than previously, thus aggravating "the evils of a capricious and semi-barbarous government by working it with all the practical ingenuity of politicians and all the monopolizing selfishness of traders" (Marx, citing Sir Stamford Raffles).

Under the influence of the British aristocracy and "moneyocracy" (the commercial capitalists) similar conditions prevailed also in India, and the "millocracy" at first continued to play a purely exploitative role. However, in time, the industrial capitalists recognized the need to bring about "the transformation of India into a reproductive country." According to Marx, this reorientation explains why British rule fulfilled "a double mission in India: one destructive, one regenerative—the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of western society in Asia. . . . The historic pages of [British] rule in India reported hardly anything beyond that destruction. The work of regeneration hardly transpires through a heap of ruins. Nevertheless it has begun."

According to Marx the process of regeneration was likely to occur in three waves, the first involving primarily technical, economic, social, and political advances, the second primarily technical, economic, and social advances, and the third, primarily social and political advances. Among the technical elements of the first wave, Marx listed "the electric telegraph" and "railways and steam vessels," among the economic elements, the introduction of "two distinct forms of private property in land" (included by Marx, despite its "abominable" forms, among the regenerative elements since private property in land was "the great *desideratum* of Asiatic society"). Among the social and political elements he listed the creation of a free press (the English introduced a free press "for the first time into Asiatic society"), and of a modern type of native administrator ("a fresh class endowed with the requirements for government and imbued with European science"), as well as the unification of the country and the creation of a modern "native army" ("organized and trained by the British drill-sergeant, the *sine qua non* of Indian self-emancipation").

Among the elements of the second wave Marx listed the training of Indian engineers and the development of a modern Indian industry—the Indians with their "excellent" intellects being "well-fitted to accumulate capital" and a modern industry being bound to "dissolve the hereditary division of labor, upon which rest the Indian castes, those decisive impediments of Indian progress and power."

Ultimately there would be a third wave. In Marx's opinion, all the just-listed advances would "lay down the material premises" for India's "development of the productive powers" and "their appropriation by the people." This last idea obviously referred to the socialist revolution which Marx envisaged as a worldwide process; in India it was interlocked with national liberation, either bestowed on the Indians by the victorious British workers or attained "by the Hindoos themselves" when they "shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether."

In view of the fact that the Marxist image of the bourgeois revolution in the West as drawn in *The Communist Manifesto* is cited by the Communist Marxists *ad nauseum* along with other parts of that document although this image has less relevance today than in 1848, it seems imperative here to reproduce Marx's major ideas concerning the bourgeois revolution in Asia, which today are highly relevant and which the Communist Marxists are not at all eager to cite. As just shown, Marx's ideas on the Indian variant of this revolution are quite specific. They are less specific, although very consequential, on Russia. And they are extremely sparse on China.

Marx saw the social revolution that was occurring in India as a process initiated by external forces: "The new elements of society were scattered among them [the Indians] by the British bourgeoisie"; and they were increasingly spread by internal forces that wanted to modernize their country. This pattern of an anti-Asiatic bourgeois revolution was more complex than that of the anti-feudal bourgeois revolution. It involved features of national conflict and social diversity different from the western experience. In the case of India, the new social elements included several types of private landowners, free journalists, modern administrators, engineers, and, in time, industrial capitalists.

In the case of Russia, Marx did not stress the class character of the western powers that shook the Tsarist regime during the Crimean War, since these powers did not conquer and "regenerate" Russia. But it so happened that, since the mid-nineteenth century, industrial capitalism became increasingly powerful in Western Europe; and Russia's proximity to this area accelerated the internal growth of anti-Asiatic elements which, in Russia as in India, were complex. According to Marx they included discontented peasants and aristocrats who were critical of the regime. According to Engels, who after 1861 acknowledged the increasing contradictions in Tsarist Russia, they included peasants and a quickly expanding bourgeoisie. Quite consistently Russian Marxists from Plekhanov to Lenin have designated the anti-Asiatic, anti-autocratic, anti-despotic revolution they wanted as a "bourgeois revolution."

With regard to China, we will recall that Marx, who in 1850 expected the immediate emergence of a revolution similar to the French revolution, in 1862 found nothing there but an Asiatic "marasmus." Different from the speedy colonization of India by a single western nation, China was invaded by several modern western powers. And during Marx's lifetime, these assaults on the Middle Kingdom were indeed inconclusive.

It has been only since the close of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth that the intensified attacks by modern industrial powers (Japan prominent among them) have shattered China's "Asiatic" monarchy—and then quickly and under circumstances that made the ensuing "bourgeois" revolution very nationalist but not very bourgeois. Dr. Sun's "constitutional" aim to destroy the monarchy interlocked with the nationalist aim to get rid of its Manchu masters. Once this was accomplished, the aim to establish genuine endogenous control over Chinese affairs was intertwined with the will to combat the country's most aggressive foreign enemy, Japan. The revolutionary force that linked the national issue and the struggle for a modern (pluralistic) state and society was at first primarily composed of Dr. Sun Yatsen's followers, in large part overseas Chinese businessmen who were not too clear about the issue of democratic pluralism and who could muster only a quite limited political strength. The student revolutionaries who at the end of World War I, and then only for a short time, became politically prominent were, in the main, dissident elements of the old bureaucratic-gentry class with little understanding of the problems of an anti-Asiatic revolution

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pointed out by Marx with respect to India. To be sure, Dr. Sun did raise a social mass problem with his plan to give land to the tillers, but the methods he proposed for its implementation—Henry George's methods—did not bring him active and organized mass support. And just when the Chinese merchants began organizing themselves on the China mainland and the aroused students endeavored to transform China culturally and politically, the country's radical forces were thrust into an open revolutionary situation with little preparation or experience to meet it.

Lacking the deep penetration which British rule had accomplished in India, and lacking the socio-economic progress which an accelerated industrialization had accomplished in Russia after the Crimean War, the anti-"Asiatic" revolution in China resembled the western bourgeois revolution even less than did corresponding movements in India and Russia.

In 1852, Marx found the proletarian revolutions of the nineteenth century much less brilliant and effective than the (western) bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth century, and much more harrassed by "inadequacies, weaknesses, and paltrinesses." They were constantly criticizing themselves, constantly interrupting themselves, and starting all over again until eventually they were able to consolidate their gains (Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Section I). This is a third important point concerning social revolution in Asia in general and in China in particular. Marx, who was very patient with the inadequacies of the proletarian revolutions of his time, was patient also with the young social revolutions that were then unfolding in Asiatic and semi-Asiatic countries. In India he expected the country's full regeneration only "at a more or less remote period." And with respect to Russia, he welcomed the emergence of all social elements so long as they were oriented toward the destruction of Tsarist despotism.

In conformity with this attitude Lenin originally welcomed all revolutionary forces bent on overthrowing the "Asiatic" state. And even in 1912, when he criticized the illusionary quality of Sun Yat-sen's "subjective socialism" he continued to hail the revolution against China's "Asiatic" state as one of the great "bourgeois revolutions in Asia."

Recognizing the weaknesses of the Chinese bourgeois revolution which went far beyond the deficiencies of Dr. Sun's socialism, it could be expected that this variant of an anti-Asiatic bourgeois revolution, like the corresponding Indian and Russian movements, would advance slowly; not as slowly to be sure as the western bourgeois revolution which, according to Marx, took over half a millenium before it was completed, but much more slowly than the advances it made in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

As we all know, the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China was not given a comparable opportunity to grow and mature. This I consider the fourth major point in an evaluation of China's social revolution. Before the "democratic" revolution could establish a mass basis in China (as it had in Russia), a new radical movement appeared which appealed to discontented elements in the countryside and, to some extent also, in the cities: Communism.

The Chinese Communist Party was founded in July 1921, four months after the Soviet Communists had crushed the Kronstadt Rebellion and three months after Lenin had, in veiled language, expressed his fear that the Communist-led Russian revolution was moving toward the establishment of a new Asiatically despotic bureaucracy. If Lenin had dared to speak as frankly in 1921 as he had done in his debate with Plekhanov in 1906/07, he

would have added that, instead of creating a socialist order in the sense of his and Marx's definition, the Bolshevik revolution was evolving into an "Asiatic restoration" (the term is Lenin's)—into a restoration of Russia's old Asiatic despotism.

The student of the history of ideas knows that since the beginning of the Socialist Marxist movement in Russia—that is, since 1883—the adherents of this movement had been made aware by Plekhanov, their top-ranking theoretical leader, that a prematurely forced revolution against the Tsarist autocracy might not promote their historical aim, a democratic and bourgeois development, but rather the restoration of Asiatically despotic conditions such as had existed in Inca Peru and Sung China. Plekhanov reverted to this argument again in 1906 after Lenin had begun to propound a new type of bourgeois democratic "worker and peasant" revolution—a type of revolution that, Plekhanov maintained, was fraught with the danger of such a restoration. Lenin went so far as to say that, if certain guarantees remained unfulfilled, an "Asiatic restoration" would be unavoidable. He named four guarantees that would prevent this development: one absolute (the proletarian socialist revolution in Western Europe), and three relative (popular control over the new revolutionary power by a government that would have no bureaucracy, no standing army, no police). None of these guarantees was fulfilled after the Bolsheviks established their dictatorship in October 1917.

Taking Lenin's comment on Sun Yat-sen's subjective socialism together with his ideas on the Asiatic restoration, we may say that, at the time of the emergence of the Chinese Communist Party, the Russian Communist movement from which it derived was subjectively moving toward socialism, but that objectively it was moving toward a system of total power that originally resembled Oriental despotism, but that in its methods of management and repression soon went beyond it. Beginning with a semi-managerial control over economic key positions in industry and communication, the Russian Communists established total managerial control first over the bulk of all industry and, less than ten years after the end of "War Communism," over the bulk of agriculture as well. Thus it can be said that they advanced from a system of *total power* (the system of Oriental despotism) to a system of *totalitarian power* (the system of modern Communism). Total power, as I define it, permitted varying degrees of freedom in the realms of economy (private peasant farming, etc.), of social life (elements of self-government in the villages, guilds, and secondary religions), and of ideas (in the core areas of religious doctrine, nonpolitical philosophy, artistic and literary activities).

Compared with the freedoms enjoyed in complex western feudal societies, the social freedoms enjoyed by members of Oriental villages, guilds, and secondary religions were extremely limited. They resulted in nothing more than a "beggars' democracy." Nevertheless they constituted genuine elements of freedom in the social sector of the agrodespotic (Oriental) order, and freedoms in the realms of economy and ideas that were by no means irrelevant.

In imperial China the degree of economic freedom was unusually high, since the possibility of owning land privately encouraged the peasant to employ an unusually intensive system of farming and provided optimal conditions for China's bureaucratic gentry to engage in intellectual pursuits. These pursuits resulted in a cultural development that, especially in the fields of literature and historiography, was not equalled in any other sector of the hydraulic world. But it hardly needs saying that these freedoms never threatened the monopoly of power enjoyed by the supreme autocrat and his ruling bureaucracy.

It is essential to remember these traditional patterns and accomplishments—and also the intellectual creativity that unfolded during the brief period of the Chinese Republic—if we want to understand what the Communist revolution has done—and undone—in China. The Chinese Communists were Moscow-spawned and their relation to Moscow remained a crucial part of their situation even after the umbilical cord was cut. During the time of their struggle for power (ca. 1929–1949), the Chinese Communists were engaging in the territories they then occupied, in a *derivative* revolution, the *root* revolution being the Russian Communist revolution. From the establishment of the Peking regime until 1959/60, the Chinese and Russian Communists formed a totalitarian superaxis in which the Soviet Union was the senior partner and Mao's China the junior partner. Since 1959/60 conflicting interests have caused a rift in their relations, and since 1963 this rift has become much deeper, but it has not resulted in a complete break in their relations. Of the four major levels on which a rift between Communist nations may occur—the levels of ideology, party, state, and society—only the first two have been involved. Unlike the Tito-Stalin rift, the hostility between Peking and Moscow, although grim, has not led to a break in diplomatic relations. And although Peking and Moscow each claim that the leaders of the other side are no longer Communists and are imposing a non-Communist policy on their respective societies, neither government has claimed that the society of the other is no longer "socialist" as each defines this term.

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Recognition of these circumstances is essential for an understanding of Peking-Moscow relations yesterday and today—and in a future in which there will be no Mao to hamper Peking's reassociation with Moscow, a policy that seems to have not a few supporters even now. But recognition of these circumstances is not particularly helpful for evaluating Communist China's internal conditions. These conditions require a variety of micro- and macro-analytical studies that are as realistic as the macro-historical concepts underlying them. Among the latter, the concept of an Asiatic restoration is decisive, not because Lenin stressed it, but because it compels us, in the light of the macro-analytical (classical) view of history and society, to determine, first of all, what kind of societal change was involved in the Communist revolution in Russia.

Marx was motivated by a strong urge for truth which, together with his urge for power, dictated his behavior. Lenin was a brilliant macro-strategist, but he paid little attention to the ideas of social science except those that were pertinent to his practical aims. And in this respect he based himself primarily on Marx, whose ideas, orthodox and classical, he knew extremely well. Applying Marx's classical view of Asiatic despotism to Russia, the core area of his revolutionary activity, and being as macro-analytically oriented as he was, Lenin quite understandably recognized the relevance of the concept of an Asiatic restoration to what he was doing in Russia. But he did not consider its significance for China, to which for obvious reasons it applies at least as well.

The Chinese Communists set up a system of total power in a world that, prior to 1911, had had no possibility of transforming their single-centered Asiatic society into a multi-centered non-Asiatic society and that, from 1912 to the thirties, advanced but slowly along this road. The Chinese Communists proceeded with their variant of an Asiatic restoration—without having to face a peasantry of the Russian type, which, having been sympathetic to a socialist peasant party, the Socialist Revolutionary Party, wanted a land reform that was very different from the one Lenin had been advocating since 1905 and particularly since April 1917. The Chinese Communists also proceeded with their Asiatic restoration against a much less clear radical intellectual opposition than had the Bolsheviks, and they did not suffer internal doctrinal qualms of the kind that plagued Lenin. To the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao included, the Marxist-Leninist concept of Asiatic society and Lenin's concept of the possibility of an Asiatic restoration had no reality, since, having been vulgar Marxists when they organized their party, they easily accepted the *lumpen* Marxist interpretation of "Asia" that had been ambivalently initiated by Lenin and ruthlessly consolidated by Stalin. Acknowledging the grave contradictions in Lenin which many critics have ignored, we find tragedy in the career of a Lenin, whose Aesopian warnings against the neo-"Asiatic" trends in Soviet society reveal a pained awareness of having betrayed the principles of his socialist creed. But there is no similar tragedy in a Mao's career, because there is no similar awareness. Mao did not betray the principles of socialism, to which he adhered officially, for the simple reason that for him these principles never had any meaning.

Today's New Left extremists, who call for the creation of a more just and free society and who in their campaigns invoke Mao Tse-tung, are, of course, even more ignorant than he. Their knowledge of non-Marxist theories of history and society is close to nil. And being suspicious of all "ideologies" their knowledge of Marx, the social scientist, and of his socio-historical thought is equally irrelevant, the evoking of Marxist slogans notwithstanding. Lacking an elementary knowledge of the *lumpen* Marxism that Mao had "creatively developed," they are in all likelihood genuinely unaware that the military-industrial establishment of the Chinese (and Russian) Communists, which excludes any popular control of military and industrial power as we know it, is far less tolerant of social and intellectual freedoms than was customary under Oriental despotism. In all likelihood they are genuinely unaware that, under the Chinese (and the Russian) system of total managerial power, man's social and human alienation—which according to Marx decreased qualitatively under the advancing ("social") capitalism of his last years—is reaching a peak under the "communist" system of totalitarian power.

Marx deplored the fragmentation of the toiling population of Asiatic society, a fragmentation that left only the dispersed villages, the rural "atoms," intact. Stalin accomplished their pulverization through his collectivization of the rural economy. Mao, who had more to destroy agronomically, found it easier to assert total power in the villages in which the Communists had monopolized political and military organization twenty years before they occupied the whole of the Chinese mainland.

The pulverization of the mass of the population has not yet reached its saturation point either in the USSR or in Communist China. But there can be no doubt that the Chinese Communists, who at a very early stage of their revolutionary history instituted atomizing controls in the territories they were occupying, were able, after their seizure of power, to initiate a policy of pulverization, not when they began their collectivization of agriculture in 1954, but as soon as they began their "land reform" in 1946.

Marx found that the atomization in Asiatic society left man no choice but to vegetate. As a young man, he had already postulated that despotism forces man to live in a political "animal kingdom." The implications of these ideas are frighteningly meaningful. As a retrogressive social revolution that moves toward the *total* alienation of man, the Chinese Communist revolution is catching up with, and indeed surpassing, the retrogressive social revolution that is occurring in the Soviet Union and in other parts of the "socialist" Communist world. □

Book Review

An Assassin's Diary

by Arthur H. Bremer
introduction by Harding Lemay
Harper's Magazine Press $6.50

Arthur Bremer is a thoroughbred failure. His diary of the six weeks before his attempt to kill Governor George Wallace is a picaresque rendering of the Great American Flop.

The first 148 pages of this unemployed busboy's journal, which he boasted would be read "as closely as the Dead Sea Scrolls," are buried somewhere in Milwaukee. What has been gleaned from the records and recollections of his acquaintances is a picture of remarkable loneliness: the only friend of Bremer's that neighbors could recall was Thomas Neuman, who shot and killed himself on May 22, 1971, while playing Russian roulette; Bremer was rejected by a sixteen-year-old girl after a date late in 1971.

Bremer's published entries are the travel notes of a man bent on killing President Nixon. Bremer has no particular cause to espouse; his clearest expression of a motive is a desire to gain attention by publishing his diary. Harper's Magazine Press published it. He writes economically and unemotionally as he trails Nixon in New York, Ottawa, and Washington.

At times Bremer's frustrated adventures take on the air of sentimental slapstick: he leaves his weapons on an airliner, only to have them returned by a conscientious hostess; for his ingenuity at concealing a gun from customs agents, he loses it in the body of his '67 Rambler; he accidentally fires his pistol in a motel room; he drives for hours in prey of Nixon, only to discover that the President has followed another route.

While the need for attention grew ever more urgent, every effort toward it was foiled. Bremer rented a limousine resembling Nixon's and took a room at the Waldorf-Astoria. Still, the exasperated assassin writes, "no one looked at me." He swaggers into a Forty-Second Street massage parlor, laying down a $30 tip, but in his anxiety he walks out after a few minutes.

Despairing of the plot to kill the Pres-

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ident, Bremer looks to a new target. At a showing of *A Clockwork Orange*, he is taken by a fantasy of killing George Wallace.

With renewed enthusiasm, he stalks Wallace across Michigan and Maryland. Snatched by a fit of mock-remorse, Bremer observes: "The whole country's going liberal. I can see it in McGovern. You know, my biggest failure may well be when I kill Wallace." His last entry, recorded two days before the Wallace shooting, declares quizzically, "My cry upon firing will be, 'A penny for your thoughts.' "

Mr. Bremer was promptly clapped in jail for his near-deadly attack on Governor Wallace, but not before the bloodhounds from *Harper's* caught a whiff of his heady account of sensational crime (many a stomach churns at the recollection of the *Harper's* cover feature a couple years back, "Manson Wins—A Fantasy").

It may seem a trifle wild, but this reviewer would like to put forward the theory that Harding Lemay does not exist; rather that, under that fanciful signature, Arthur Bremer himself wrote the introduction to this volume in his most subtle effort to exonerate himself while passing off the blame for his crime on American society as a whole and Richard Nixon, *ex officio*. "Lemay" pontificates: "So perhaps Bremer is, as he feared, 'just another god Damn failure.' If anyone can be a failure at twenty-two. And who decides who is a failure? During the recent days of unprecedented bombings in Southeast Asia, I find it hard to believe anyone's life can match the failure of Richard Nixon's. . . . [Bremer's] life is not over, as he hoped it would be; it is merely hidden from the society that betrayed him by cheapening the values we all live by and robbing him of meaning beyond what we can glean from these pathetic scribblings about his hopes, his fears, and his need for future renown, aspects of the human being we all share with him as we share the shame that produced him."

Heavy stuff, this collective breast-beating; but if the reader will pardon another lapse of professional modesty, I would submit that, if "Lemay's" introduction had been entered as evidence in the Maryland trial, Bremer would be resting comfortably today in a psychiatric ward, *non compos mentis*.

Need I banter with the reader's intelligence any longer? It goes without saying that if "Lemay's" assertion of President Nixon's complicity in the Wallace shooting were aired in open court, even America's conscience, Senator Weicker, would guffaw.

A final irony is that the greatest success in Bremer's life has been the publication of this chronicle of failure; as his memory gathers dust in the Maryland State Penitentiary, Bremer is chalking up royalties on this copyrighted work. And he has sixty-two more years in which to collect his prison memoirs. A penny for your thoughts, Arthur.

J.P. Duggan

Book Review

At the End of the Day

by Harold Macmillan
Macmillan £4.50
Harper & Row will publish in January

André Malraux once said of General de Gaulle that he was "the man of the day before yesterday and the man of the day after tomorrow," meaning by this that the General drew his inspiration from a past often remote and cast his vision forward to a future equally distant. In addition, like Macmillan, de Gaulle was a brilliant tactician of today: either man was more than capable of outmaneuvering, in the quotidian intrigues of politics, almost any rival or combination of rivals. Now, although he always relished that capacity of his—few politicians have enjoyed the game more than did Macmillan: he practically invented his Edwardian personality as a move in that game—Macmillan also looked to the distant future. A colleague has told me that Macmillan considers the chronicle of his life, which closes with this volume, to be aimed, not at those reading it now, not even at the students of a next generation—but further on, perhaps fifty or a hundred or more years ahead.

And it is a chronicle. The Macmillan memoirs have almost nothing of revelation, or indiscretion, nor even very much of special pleading about them. For example, readers in Britain avidly awaited two volumes in particular of the series—the one dealing with the Suez operation, and the present one, because it might be expected to give Macmillan's version of the strange sequence of events which led to the emergence of the Earl of Home as Prime Minister of Britain in 1963 (he was not elected, but chosen by the Establishment after a still uncertain amount of consultation with the Party's members of parliament), when illness forced Macmillan himself to lay down his burden. Two ministers—the late Iain Macleod and Enoch Powell—refused to serve Home; he lost, though only narrowly, the general election of 1964; and he left the leadership of the Party the following year. Macleod and Powell refused their services, and many like-minded Tories their allegiance, because they believed that Macmillan had maneuvered the Home succession, which was thought to be the culminating move in a deep plot of his, running for many years, to deny the succession to R.A. Butler, his deputy Prime Minister, and *guru* of the young Tories of the postwar generation. Macmillan denies that he intrigued for Home and argues—in my view with a great deal of justification—that the fourteenth Earl was the favored choice of a great majority of the parliamentary party: certainly, Home would have been, after his triumph at the party conference of October 1963, the choice of the party in the country, whose darling he still is. But nowhere is there any account of how Alec Home came to be a candidate for the leadership: he did not put himself forward—he was quite unambitious; and there is evidence to suggest that when he discovered how much opposition his candidacy would meet, he felt betrayed. "I thought I was coming as a healer," he said. Since it was Macmillan he rang with this rather angry view, there can be little doubt about who his sponsor was: but Macmillan has nothing to say.

Thus, for the historian of detail, there is very little in these memoirs. However, partly since they are in large part made up of a contemporary diary, they are extremely valuable for what they tell us about Harold Macmillan, the magician of modern British politics, a man who, when he came to the leadership after the Suez debacle, restored his party almost by sleight of hand, and led it to an election triumph in 1959; a man who first tried to get Britain into the EEC; who presided over the final liquidation of the British Empire; and whose government came to its end in the aftermath of sordid scandal and the breakdown of his own health.

Macmillan was a man of yesterday and the day after tomorrow. In personal style, in temperament, in feeling, he was the last British leader (except Home—but he led only briefly) who was bred and formed in the great days of Britain. But he knew those days were past. He exerted himself, by the grandiosity of his style, to conceal that fact from his fellow-countrymen, partly in order to assuage their hurt, partly in order to lead them deviously into a new future, that of the EEC, in which enterprise, though he failed, his lieutenant and ultimate successor Edward Heath has at least temporarily succeeded. He made a herculean effort to shake off Britain's past: when Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the pretty *nouveau arriviste* Labour Party attacked the decision to enter Europe as a betrayal of a thousand years of history, Macmillan replied, "For them a thousand years of history—for us, the future," a remark that was astonishing from the leader of the history-drenched Tory Party. His own place in history Macmillan sought to define by large brushstrokes: he wanted nothing less than to alter radically the history of his country, and even change its nature.

Thus, much was neglected. Though a competent domestic Prime Minister, he was no more than that. During his period of office the terrible economic problems which beset the country today first gained a tight grip on the nation's throat. He ran the

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economy, more or less: he never made strategic decisions about it. His patriotism, his nationalism, his conservatism, dance before the eyes: he was a conservative by attitude, not from principles. He kept the show he found on the road, and he healed and patched here and there as Nemesis crept up behind him. It is a curious feature of his career that a man bent on such ultimately radical change in the historical direction of his country was so content with the mushy amalgam of attitudes, policies, and complacencies which his country and his party accepted under his rule. Yet he was an extraordinary man—ruthless, but generous; visionary, but old-fashioned; fraudulent in many ways, but with a streak of nobility. And, where he wanted to be, he was a man of extraordinary imagination, however much one might detest the direction the imagination took. It will take at least fifty years to assess him.

Patrick Cosgrave

The Child as Guinea Pig

This fall, a number of American cities are witnessing, once again, local variations on an increasingly familiar political theme. In Indianapolis, the Honorable S. Hugh Dillin, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Indiana, has handed down a ruling specifying just how much cross-district busing of how many public school pupils will make the racial composition of the different units of the Indianapolis Public School System consistent with Judge Dillin's vision of the requirements of the U.S. Constitution. In Atlanta, the local chapter of the NAACP is being threatened with revocation of its charter for supporting a compromise school integration plan, again involving the busing of elementary school children, which the Association's national leadership feels does not go far enough in promoting the black/white pupil ratio which would be morally, socially, and constitutionally valid for Atlanta classrooms. In Boston, the action proceeds apace in several arenas. On Beacon Hill, the state legislature is deciding whether to override Governor Francis Sargent's veto of a bill which sought to suspend for a year the requirements of the state's Racial Imbalance Act. The legislature passed the act a while back to promote both racial balance in the public schools and its own self-image as a progressive body of lawmakers. Now they want to hold back a bit because communities are running into budgetary and other problems in their attempts to comply. Sargent doesn't want to let them do it. The Governor, you see, considers himself a "creative Republican" (just like Senator Brooke of the same state), and he feels this is a good issue on which to demonstrate how much more enlightened he is than normal, dull, uncreative Republicans. Meanwhile, the municipality itself cranks up for city council and school board elections. In the former, Louise Day Hicks is preparing for yet another session with the Boston electorate. Mrs. Hicks has little to offer in these encounters beyond her maiden name (a famous one in these parts) and her vehement opposition to busing; Mrs. Hicks usually does quite well, and will probably do so again. In the school contest, almost all the candidates are going out of their way to express their deep concern for the children of Boston and their fervent belief that busing is bad. This is true even of the young lady who is the candidate of the "Communist Progressive Labor Party" —(although it is possible that PL opposes busing because they feel that forced integration will, in some way, delay the capital-R Revolution).

The sophisticated among you have probably already figured out that the common theme in these little stories involves the busing of public school pupils to achieve what most of the nation's communications media innocently call "racial balance." Actually, of course, the phrase is not innocent at all—everyone knows that "balance" is a good idea, and that "imbalance" implies that something is wrong. Personally, I suspect this particular phrase is popular in liberal circles precisely because of those implications. For busing has become one of the most important tests American liberals apply in their continuing efforts to separate the good guys from the bad guys. To be for busing indicates that one is "sensitive to the plight of American blacks," and is concerned with "ending discrimination in the nation's school systems." To be against busing is (like so many other things) a sign of one's insensitivity and/or racism, be it of the blatant or latent variety.

For some reason, however, a number of Americans are violently opposed to busing despite such arguments, and seem quite willing to live with the opprobrium that attaches to such "wrongheadedness." Indeed, politicians like Mrs. Hicks do well because the number of such "wrongheaded" people seems to be rather great. I submit that the reason for this is that whatever else one may think of Louise Day Hicks, on this one she and her supporters are exactly right.

What is the major argument for busing? A proponent will almost certainly tell you that busing is necessary to promote "equal" education. It is exceedingly difficult, however, to figure out how forcing every school in a given system to have certain percentages of black and white pupils yields more "equal" education. If one judges equality by measuring the performance of minority students, the available data indicate that the racial composition of the school one attends makes very little difference. Such is the finding of the Coleman Report, the product of a two-year study of the nation's educational system, authorized by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After conducting extensive and complicated tests that separated and analyzed the different factors affecting performance in schools, the Report noted that "School-to-school variations in achievement, from whatever source . . . are much smaller than individual variations within the school, at all grade levels, for all racial and ethnic groups. *This means that most of the variation in achievement could not possibly be accounted for by school differences, since most of it lies within the school*" (emphasis added). In addition, says the Report, most differences in performance show up from the moment of entry into the school system; in other words, "the larger part of school-to-school variation in achievement appears not to be a consequence of effects of school variation at all, but of variations in family backgrounds of the entering student bodies."

The proponent of busing will probably reply that even if forced integration does not yield substantial improvement in the performance of minority school children, it should be pursued anyway as a "social good." This argument runs roughly as follows: "Look, if we just get black kids and white kids together at an early enough age, they'll learn that they aren't that different, really, and they'll get along and become friends. Integration is important if our multi-racial society is to become truly one nation, and the schools provide an excellent place to develop that kind of cohesiveness."

These ideas have a lot of sentimental appeal; many people like them so much that they feel the whole solution to racial problems *must* lie somewhere along these lines. Unfortunately, this whole argument rests on the assumption that differences between the races are totally the product of misunderstanding and discrimination—and this is manifestly not the case. As Edward Banfield points out in *The Unheavenly City*, the major differences between the races are cultural ones—the most crucial distinction being that inner city blacks tend to be radically present-oriented, as opposed to their future-oriented, gratification-delaying, middle-class white brethren. Banfield does not argue that such differences are *caused* by race; he does point out, however, that such differences are linked with race, and furthermore, that they are serious differences. By

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"culture," he does not mean variations in hair styles and musical tastes; he refers instead to fundamental attitudes that affect the degree to which one can accept and become a part of a goal-oriented, individualistic society. At bottom, racial tension in the United States is rooted in precisely such cultural differences. In part, the cultures do not mix because the implicit philosophy of each rejects that which is most valued by the other; and more concretely, the differential achievement which follows from this cultural variation causes the less wealthy group to resent and envy the success of the richer one, which in turn fears and despises the poorer group's failure.

The implications of this for the potential efficacy of busing as a means of easing racial tensions are fairly straightforward. If those tensions spring less from "misunderstandings" than from fundamental cultural differences, it would follow that busing, to be effective, must deal with those differences. But this, it seems to me, is precisely what the Coleman Report indicates busing will not do. All busing does is change the racial make-up of the student body, and this turns out to have very little effect on how well the school deals with the results of culturally-based differences. In other words, one cannot expect to solve racial problems, rooted in culture, merely by thrusting the young of both races together in the nation's school systems.

Now, this is a highly emotional topic, and accordingly, it is important to specify with precision what the above argument is and is not saying. It does not assert that schools are completely ineffective in attempting to socialize different groups into American society; it merely states that the racial make-up of a particular school does not affect how well the school does this job. Similarly, the argument is not that because racial differences are bound up in cultural ones, the situations of blacks and whites in American society are immutable. On the contrary, this author would be among the first to argue that those relative situations have become a great deal more equal. The point is that whatever complicated processes are at work in promoting that equality, it is clear that "racial balance" in public school systems has very little to do with them. And finally, the above discussion is certainly not a brief for legally enforced segregation of any kind. As cultural differences become less linked with race, racial integration in every area of social activity will perforce become more pronounced—as indeed it has in the past several years. This integration is a clear sign of greater cohesion in the society, and it is foolish indeed for society to attempt to slow or prohibit such a development. What one must realize, however, is that the process does not work in reverse. In other words, it does not follow that by "creating" integration with school buses and federal court orders one will also be able to create greater social cohesion and eliminate those fundamental cultural differences that threaten cohesion in the first place.

The American liberal in the seventies will, of course, have none of this. He believes that in a good society no social and economic differences can be linked with race. He asserts that any such linkage *must* be due to discrimination, because for some reason he feels that discrimination is something he can change. And he believes that somehow, by making all the numbers come out "right" (be it done with "quotas" or with busing) he has solved whatever it is that makes those numbers come out "wrong" to him in the first place.

Unfortunately, these little delusions have rather pernicious results. The children of all those people who vote for Louise Day Hicks are forced to become the guinea pigs of this failed social experiment. The taxes of their parents are used to pay for it. Legitimate parental fears about the safety of children who are thrust into these situations of cultural confrontation are passed off as racism. Legitimate parental aspirations to select the area in which one's children will live and attend school are casually dismissed as inconsistent with the dictates of "racial balance." And all of us are told that the violent reaction against busing is yet another sign of something deeply wrong with American society.

The nation, I think, should spare itself these traumas. Its racial differences are rooted in complicated factors which the busing of school children to achieve "racial balance" will not remove. It is unfortunate, perhaps, that our problems in this area are more complex than the proponents of busing would have us believe. But it is clear that merely pretending that the whole issue is a simple matter of juggling black/white pupil ratios is leading us nowhere. Given all the problems that juggling creates, I think it's about time we quit. □

Great American Series

"Everyone likes me," said the man.
"That is Popularity," whispered the little star.
"Everyone likes me and envies me," said the man, a year later.
"That is Fame," whispered the little star.
"Everyone despises me," said the man, a year later still.
"That is Time," whispered the little star.

George Jean Nathan

Brudnoy's Film Index

■ **American Graffiti**: 1962 hot-rods, the hop, rock 'n roll, four boys, their girls, a time of testing for all: the best damn nostalgia flick in a very long time. For us over thirty, a must; for infants, teenie-boppers, and sub-thirty smart-asses—eat your hearts out.

■ **Bang the Drum Slowly**: Friendship between two ball players, one goofy and dying, the other a star. Michael Moriarty and Robert De Niro are splendid as Henry and his hopeless pal Bruce. Vincent Gardenia as the manager, and all the other supporting cast members contribute to a splendid cinema experience.

■ **Enter the Dragon**: Ai-yeee! Ha-AHHHHHH!! Ooooo-weeee! Bruce Lee! Chopppeeee!

■ **Heavy Traffic**: Cartoon full-length feature: vulgar, cruel, cheeky, not for your Bambi and Dumbo crowd. Brilliantly drawn, viciously objectionable.

■ **I Could Never Have Sex With Any Man Who Has So Little Regard For My Husband**: Oh come now; what's a little fault among friends? This is *not* the comedy of the year. Or of the month. Or the week. But pronouncing the title is good exercise, and rearranging the letters makes for a scatological oath in Hindi.

■ **Jeremy**: Light but sweet young love in Spraypaint Village. Even an upbeat mood, and a minimum of treacle.

■ **Jesus Christ Superstar**: Still hanging in there. Most of the critics hate it; The People demur.

■ **Last Tango in Paris**: It won't go away. Mzzzzzz Kael's favorite movie of the century, almost. Brando's rump; Schneider's everything. OK, a "happening," but don't expect to get your five bucks' worth.

■ **Le Sex Shop**: Hey meester, wanna see some feelthy pictures? Claude Beri's farce about the unsuccessful bookshop owner who bends with the times and turns to porn. The store blooms, but his attempt at swinging fizzles.

■ **The Mackintosh Man**: Paul Newman, Dominique Sanda, James Mason, respectively dreary, incomprehensible, and splendid. Plot? Yes, there is probably a plot. Something about espionage, diamonds—something like that, sort of.

■ **Night Watch**: Elizabeth Taylor hasn't looked so good in years, and her plight—Is husband Lawrence Harvey and her best gal friend trying to drive her mad? Is she going mad? Is her late husband come to haunt her?—offers possibilities for an interesting movie. Someone really should make it sometime. This one, for most of its duration, has all the chillies of Caspar the Ghost, but when the corpses *do* materialize, they are a *sight*.

■ **Scarecrow**: Al Pacino and Gene Hackman as another odd couple, acting very well in a flick programmed to jerk every tear and arouse every tender passion. Somehow, it doesn't quite make it.

■ **Ssssss**: A witless tale of men turning into serpents. Hissssssssss.

■ **Visions of Eight**: Last year's Olympics, through eight directors' eyes: Arthur Penn, Milos Forman, Claude Lelouch, John Schlesinger, Kon Ichikawa, Juri Ozerov, Michael Pfleghar, Mai Zetterling. Less than two hours of mostly splendid photography, athletic grace, commercial smoothness, a documentary that works. □

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Book Review

Retreat from Victory

by Drew Middleton
Hawthorn Books $7.95

Drew Middleton, the distinguished *New York Times* correspondent, has written a newspaperman's account of the decline of American power. Facts and interpretations, in large part, are the fruit of the author's firsthand experience overseas. There is no scholarly quibbling here, and little evidence of scholarly sweat. Middleton writes like a man on deadline. Subject-predicate, subject-predicate, he recounts the course of American foreign policy since the close of World War I. Later, he turns to the present state of American weaponry and resolve.

The dulling trauma of the Vietnam war and the intellectual poison of the eastern liberals, Middleton concludes, have served to replace national self-confidence with national self-doubt. While the world's work awaits the strong arm and the willing heart, the United States sets both its hands to wringing. Mere assertions will not end the Cold War; not even a presidential trip to Moscow will long still Soviet ambitions. But does America understand the challenge?

"Do we have the capacity to fulfill our commitments," he asks. "Which means, really, do we have the will? At this moment, no. There are far too many signs, which have proven accurate in the past, that there is a general decline in the will, if not the energies, of America."

Middleton has argued a credible and timely thesis—*Jane's Fighting Ships*, in late July, declared the Soviet navy the world's strongest—but the reasonably informed reader may ask why he took 250 pages to do it. Much of the book, particularly the chapters of historical background, ring with textbook familiarity. (Both reader and author find themselves on more substantial ground in the concluding analyses of strategic and military policy.)

The author brings to *Retreat from Victory* both a broad background in foreign reporting and an unabashed love for his own country. While arguing effectively against portside historiography, he avoids, for the most part, the pitfalls of the unreflective Right. But in the matter of society's claim on the individual—and perhaps no other issue is quite as central to the foreign policy of a free nation—Mr. Middleton stumbles. "One striking sociological development in the [Vietnam] war," he writes, "was the manner in which the sons of the best people escaped it. The young men of the great universities in the Ivy League and of similar institutions in the far and middle West sat this one out. They, who had received the most from their country, repaid the least. These were the same people who, a few years before, had cheered John F. Kennedy's admonition to ask not what they would receive from their country, but what they could do for their country."

An altogether more wholesome approach, others have pointed out, is to avoid either question. Rather, concentrate on the improvement of one by one. A robust, imaginative society, after all, is ultimately no more than a collection of robust, imaginative individuals. The conceit of the Great Society was that greatness, never mind excellence, could be imposed by sociological fiat. Wiser men in these heady days counsel that such qualities flow only from the spirit of those capable of lifelong commitment. In the arena of world politics, where states wrestle barechested, the temptation is strong to seek the vicarious excellence of collective action—redemption through foreign meddling.

Middleton has offered us fair warning of the wages of weakness. A nation of free men must likewise forswear the statist road of crusade. To strike a just balance between the two extremes is a goal worthy of all Washington.

James Grant

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
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page 3
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and reviews of Eisenhower, Buffet, Jencks, and Rostow

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EDITORIAL
(continued from page 3)

lishes it for its own sake." In a way the intellectual is a descendant of the court jester, as Ralph Dahrendorf has pointed out, for he has the same privileges of dispensing with propriety and remaining beyond categories or roles established by society. He also dresses funny, as Woody Allen has percipiently pointed out.

And Robert Nisbet adds a fourth quality, emulation of a certain style—the style of brilliance, beyond intelligence or profundity. It is a quality that was not much celebrated in the past, but in our day it has truly come into its own. No critic ever puffed up Brahms' German Requiem as "brilliant." When the critics sat in on Bernstein's pathetic attempt at a mass, "brilliant" was about all that they could say.

To all of this I should like to add or emphasize that the true intellectual must be possessed of a critical mind. He must be willing and capable of criticizing absolutely everything—everything but himself. Criticizing oneself, for an intellectual, becomes problematic. It is done, but not often, and never very seriously. What is more, an

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

Here is a true story for your reading pleasure.

While on a hiking trip on the Appalachian Trail, I shared a campsite with a Midwestern family, very typical saccharine liberals (even the grammar schoolers). In the course of our interview, they mentioned that their home was in Bloomington, Indiana. Carping the diem in my usual fashion, I began to sing the praises of *The Alternative*. My new friends must have been acquainted with ya'll, for their countenances became exceeding wroth, and they avoided me thereafter as if I were a deadly pox. And to think, I owe it to ya'll.

Cum grano salis.

Ed Dupree
Chapel Hill, North Carolina

To the Editor:

The article by Richard Wheeler is the best ever.

John Woodrift
Somerset, Virginia

To the Editor:

I like your paper and I applaud it.

Please try to tighten up on your (plural) *writing*!

Rev. Gerard F. Yates
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.

To the Editor:

You are to be congratulated for luring Lindley Clark into your magazine. He is quite simply the best financial writer in the world, and while talent of this kind seems somewhat out of place in your zany journal, I am sure it will be to good purpose if your readers come to enjoy his graceful, intelligent commentary as much as I have (in the *Wall Street Journal*) over the past several years.

Jameson Campaigne
Chicago, Illinois

To the Editor:

Many thanks for your marvelous editorial on "Gatsby and Nixon" that merited the *Chicago Daily News* and my quotes.

To your indictments may I add that Watergate culminates but at the same time smokescreens the fires and greater crimes beneath—the mounting horrors in our own streets, homes, and lives day by day.

The Ervin Committee must quickly expose and the Courts punish every Watergater; but meanwhile every American, the media and Representative dare not hush-hush but must shout from their rooftops and demonstrate that Congress' first priority is to immediately get at the root causes and remedies for our spiralling burglaries and murders.

At least the major source is from the 20-30 million desperate people in the families of our jobless and bankrupt small businesses; and the quickest alleviation or remedy is NOT to squander more billions of dollars to trap and put away a handful of criminals who are immediately replaced—but by Congress *investing* in adequate training and jobs for every American's unique abilities, "from digger to musician, tradesman or physician."

Idleness and disastrous mal-distribution of our fabulous wealth are the cancers killing Americans and "metastesizing" presidents, and unless Congress quickly does more than throw a few more buggers in jail or even impeach the President, America is in for far more personal and collective agonies.

Sincerely,
Sidney Blackstone
President of Sidney Blackstone & Co.
Chicago, Illinois

To the Editor:

Your barroom brawl, last issue, was interesting. There was "Randolph," adopting a pseudonym to air the classic-hostile view that homosexuals are evil, have an unholy seductive power, thus must be deprived of certain rights. Down the bar a bit, there was C.H. Simonds blaring out the frantic warning—that if the evil ones are allowed freedom, they inevitably end up committing mass murders. Then there was the anxious-civilized E.T. Veal saying: Oh, to be sure, we must allow them their rights, *but* is homosexuality a volitional neurosis, hence immoral? And finally, there was Brudnoy, ducking the punches and low blows, and yelling: They're people, they're people, so they have a right to existence, to self-expression, and to the pursuit of happiness. Three bully boys and one constitutionalist. A pretty odd performance in a sophisticated libertarian publication.

I would suggest to "Randolph" that rights are inalienable, and that he handle his fear of the seductive powers of homosexuals in some other fashion.

To C.H. Simonds, I would say that if mass murder is the "logical extreme" of Gay Lib, he's going to have his hands full explaining mass murders by Hitler, Stalin, Mao. All, I believe, were heterosexuals.

To E.T. Veal, I would point out that the world is full of neurotics, that all have volitional components in their neuroses, and that, even assuming that homosexuality is a volitionally induced neurosis, he still has to face the chore of individual judgment. It is not self-evident that a homosexual James Baldwin is more sick-immoral than heterosexual rapist Eldridge Cleaver . . . that homosexual Michael Angelo is more sick-immoral than heterosexual Richard Nixon . . . that homosexual Noel Coward is more sick-immoral than the heterosexuals who love "Sticks and Bones." I would also tell E.T. Veal that individual psychologies are very complex, consist of much more than sexual attitudes, that each individual must be judged scrupulously by a whole *battery* of standards—and that he should leave simplistic moral assessments of huge groups to liberal collectivists and frantic fundamentalists.

As for D. Brudnoy, I'm on his side. (But, on the basis of reading him in other publications, I'd like to suggest that the time has come for him to adopt a little Libertarian consistency. He can't advocate the censorship of "Maude," drag the State into the abortion area, and simultaneously advocate sexual freedom. Either the State must be kicked out of the entire area, or it mustn't.)

If one understands the concept of rights, one applies them to all people whether their values (sexual or otherwise) are congenial or displeasing. The problem of co-existence with unpleasing people of any category is not particularly difficult of resolution. Take the extreme case so dreaded by "Randolph"—that of a Bestial Libber. The B.L. obviously has a right to his relationship with a consenting billy goat. He even has a right to compare it to the bond between Heloise and Abelard—under the First Amendment. But "Randolph" has a right to a lock on his door, to an unlisted phone number, to a "No Trespassers" sign on his private property, as well as the right to evaluate others as he pleases. If "Randolph" now cancels his subscription on the grounds that a voice has spoken up in these pages for "Bestial Lib," send it to me.

Edith Efron
Los Angeles, California

To the Editor:

R. Emmett Tyrrell's likening of the Great Nixon to the Great Gatsby was no exaggeration.

When Nixon acknowledged the fall of Spiro Agnew and announced his substitution of Jerry Ford, the All-American center from Michigan, he chose the setting of a carnival soirée. Such was the grossness of the President's lack of tact and subtlety that the television spectator was made to feel like a young Baptist minister who had strayed into an Irish wake.

When the sunlight shines again upon Washington after this tempestuous time, perhaps the more fitting metaphor from the literature of the Twenties will be "The Nixon Administration as The Waste Land."

Sincerely,
Karen Stephens
Kirkwood, Missouri

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intellectual's criticism must be annoying, and the more annoying he is, the more effective he is and the more opulently he can live. It seems that criticism is the fruit of his labor, and the criticism need not be especially prudent or thoughtful—though it must always be brilliant.

Finally the very best of the intellectuals are independent and have no responsibility for their ideas whatsoever. In fact it is best that they have no firsthand knowledge of their material. When they do, when they fall in with a bad crowd of government bureaucrats, statesmen, politicians, and the like, as Arthur Schlesinger did some twelve years ago, they sully their credentials as intellectuals. They find themselves pecked at in the unreadable pages of the *New York Review of Books*, and they have to scramble if they are ever to get back in the good graces of intellectuals.

Now from the above taxidermic rendition of the qualities of the intellectual it becomes manifest why it is so difficult to lay down a satisfactory description of intellectuals. Obviously, many people possess the intellectuals' qualities only by degrees. I think this is true today, and I think this is true because our society has, for better or for worse, become intellectualized. Newspaper reporters, who a generation ago might have had no less knowledge or talent, today consider themselves vaguely intellectual merely because at college they were told to read Sartre or Eldridge Cleaver, or because they have an enthusiasm for French wines or because they harbor deep within their bosoms a gnawing conviction that something good or beatific goes on inside Orchestra Hall. Indeed they have some good reasons for the way they feel. They are apt to be more cosmopolitan than their ancestors. They do indeed seem to be a bit more like intellectuals. After all they have probably identified with at least one 24-carat intellectual as he induced sleep while on a television talk show. Their ancestor never had that kind of experience to broaden his horizon.

What we have today are concentric circles of intellectuals. We have the core species, unmongrelized by outside pressures or responsibilities, and they are surrounded by more and more concentric circles of persons who approximate them in varying degrees, depending on propinquity to the core. They live for words and ideas, they are very

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much *engagés*. They delight in the play of the mind. They have a special style. They are cosmopolitan. I think Irving Kristol would say they possess urban values.

Now the hard-core intellectual has not always been such a glamorous critter. His direct antecedent, the writer, scratched away at a marginal existence. But during the postwar period the writer or intellectual migrated to new environs, environs which are now central to American life. I have in mind, of course, the university and the American college campus.

There have always been a few strayed intellectuals roaming around campuses. But the intellectuals' special domain between the two world wars was Greenwich Village and to some extent Paris. Their outlets were a few magazines with small circulations and their institutions were *ad hoc* associations designed generally for political purposes. They were at best a few congenial publishing houses and even these were not run by intellectuals. In fact, H.L. Mencken asserts that this was true even before the First World War when Theodore Dreiser and his crowd resided in the Village. For an insight into the lowly origins of the now glorious American intellectual, I suggest you read Mencken's correspondence with his friend Dreiser and his reviews of Dreiser's work. Certainly many of us would be quick to categorize Mencken as a prototype American intellectual, yet he tirelessly rebuked his friend Dreiser for Dreiser's bohemian way of life and he reviled the Greenwich Village boobs. To him they were a trashy collection of sciolists. And the description is not without its authenticity.

Nevertheless these are flush times for the intellectuals and their coming of age can be marked at least symbolically when Philip Rahv and William Phillips were annointed professors. Both had been editors of the central intellectual review of the forties, *Partisan Review*.

Of course, the change was much deeper. Not only did the editors and writers of select little magazines become professors, but college and university curricula now became more contemporary, or more intellectualized if you will. And in 1964 while the Republicans were letting the hundred flowers bloom, something equally dramatic was happening at Berkeley.

Political concerns, which had once been merely the concerns of a small band of intellectuals, now became the obsession of a major American university—a ghetto became intellectualized. As such political concerns swept across the nation's campuses, the centrality of intellectuals to our lives became manifest. By the late sixties the intellectuals had arrived.

University faculties now embrace something like 600,000 souls, and pollsters claim that over three-fourths consider themselves intellectuals. Millions of students presume to be intellectuals and every major publishing house is blessed with young editors who are either themselves intellectuals or are in close contact with intellectuals. Generally the circulations of the intellectual journals have soared. Magazines like *Playboy* and *Esquire* now regularly feature the essays, reviews, and interviews of intellectuals. Exactly how highly intellectualized these magazines have become is revealed by the recent incidence of suicide amongst their staffs.

Taking the long view there may not be anything wrong with this intellectualization of American society. When all the thunder and lightning has subsided the intellectuals may usher us into a land of milk and honey and kinetic poetry. But I am dubious. As Irving Kristol points out, the American Republic was built on two pillars or perceptions. The first was self-interest "rightly-understood." The second was what the Founders variously referred to as a sense of "Republican virtue," "civic virtue," or "republican morality." The Founders were somewhat visionary, though not ambiguously so. They placed about equal stress on both pillars. They were chary of what Irving Kristol calls the "urban mentality," a mentality that is "irreverent, speculative, pleasure-loving, self-serving, belligerent toward all conventional pieties"—a mentality that has become intellectualized. The Founders doubted that this mentality would comport amiably with Republican virtue. In fact a glance at the issues of contemporary American society seems to indicate that the urban mentality is at war with this second pillar which the Founders felt so important. Put another way the intellectuals do not have much reverence for the Protestant ethic, the idea of deferred gratification, the dull philistine life style of liberal capitalism . . . the contemporary evolution of the American Republic. Their political concerns are certainly antibourgeois. So are their aesthetic or cultural concerns. Their current political fascinations are a spike into the heart of liberalism.

What Irving Kristol dissects as the elements of Republican morality: "steadiness of character, deliberativeness of mind, and a mild predisposition to subordinate one's own special interests to the public interest," are the kinds of values guaranteed to make the paradigmatic intellectual choke.

Oh, it's true that for short periods the intellectuals have fared residence in America congenial to the highfalutin tastes. During the fifties and late forties, after America had boxed Hitler's ears and when we resolutely faced the Soviet tyrant, intellectuals for the first time in years whooped it up for the USA. They praised America's encouragement of group life and diversity, its ability to change peacefully, its generosity, openness, its relative classlessness, and its hospitality to foreign immigration. Today each of those virtues has become transparent in the intellectual's eyes. Today Americans are the "most dangerous people of the earth."

At this point I should mention that if my readings of Bernard Bailyn are sound, the Founders' visions of Republican morality would be shaken a bit by our contemporary evolutions in liberal capitalism. Its economics were beyond their imaginations and seem to be a bit beyond our own imaginations. There is little doubt that what has become liberal democracy is a bit different than the popular government of the Founders. But this goes beyond our present concern. The point is that both the democracy of the Founders and of our own liberal capi-

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The Bootblack Stand

George Washington Plunkitt

Dr. George Washington Plunkitt, our prize-winning political analyst, is celebrating the publication of his new book, which is now available at avant-garde *bookstores throughout New Jersey. Dr. Plunkitt's book is about the importance of altruism in politics and it is titled* What's in It for Me? *Although Dr. Plunkitt expects to earn ten million dollars from sales of his new book, he has agreed to continue to advise public figures through this column. Address all correspondence to The Bootblack Stand, c/o The Establishment, R.R. 11, Box 360, Bloomington, Indiana 47401, Continental U.S.A.*

Dear Mr. Plunkitt:

As you can see from all the things I have been doing I have taken to improving my mind. I am curious about life, and sensitive to all the wondrous beauties therein. What I want to know is, how do clams have sex?

Peace and Freedom and an Open Sky,
Jane Fonda

Dear Miss Fonda:

Once again you have thrown me. If your mind continues to develop, you may replace Kingman Brewster as president of Yale.

Regarding your immediate question I believe there was a Book-of-the-Month Club selection several months ago which discussed the sexual longings of saltwater bivalves. It came out the month before Dr. Sidney Dome's *Weird Sex Rites of Small Rocks and Lichens*, and several months before the Book-of-the-Month Club featured Sister Mary Torrid's *The Joys of Sado-Masochism.*

—GWP

Dear Desert Demosthenes:

It has been brought to my attention that in your October column you vilified me and cast aspersions on my very intelligence. This sort of *ad hominem* argument is despicable. I demand an apology. You have not only insulted me but also my race.

Senator Montoya

Dear Senator Montoya:

I fully apologize for my animadversions on you and on your race. As penance I intend to stand on the steps of Saint Patrick's Cathedral and perform the tango for twenty-four straight hours while ingesting nothing more nourishing than chile dogs and peppers. If I have chosen the wrong race let me know. I can always choose another dance. Incidentally, I was hasty in my judgment of your intellect. After watching your latest performances on television I want to compliment you for being one of the few men I have known to be able to sleep with his eyes open. Is there any truth to the rumor that your IQ ranks in the "vegetable" category?

—GWP

talism, our bourgeois state, are inimical to intellectuals.

According to Joseph Schumpeter this was ever meant to be, for liberal capitalism actually emboldens the mentality of the intellectual. Schumpeter feels that "the capitalist process produced that atmosphere of almost universal hostility to its own social order." Capitalism is so successful at producing goods and services that the need for its function is eventually lost in an avalanche of transistorized components, electric gadgets, trashy houses, preposterous automobiles—mass-produced goods that but a generation ago were considered luxuries. Further, capitalism creates "a critical frame of mind which, after having destroyed the moral authority of so many other institutions, in the end turns against its own; the bourgeois finds to his amazement that the rationalist attitude does not stop at the credentials of kings and popes but goes on to attack private property and the whole scheme of bourgeois values."

And the bourgeois is incapable of preventing this animus to swell up. One reason for this is that it is "an error to believe that political attack arises from grievance and that it can be turned by justification." Any student of political discourse in America today knows that there is no way either Mr. Nixon or Mr. McGoo or others like them are going in the midst of a campaign to blush and fess up that they have been out to lunch. And to believe that this will happen in the more ideological salons of the intellectuals is to be dulcetly idealistic, but to be naive nonetheless. "From the fact that criticism of the capitalist order proceeds from a critical attitude of mind, i.e. from an attitude which spurns allegiance to extra-rational values, it does not follow that rational refutation will be accepted" by the critics themselves. The most smashing refutation of an antagonist will not necessarily silence him. Capitalist rationality does not eliminate subrational or superrational impulses, rather it encourages them by eliminating the restraints of a sense of the sacred. Another reason that liberal capitalism is incapable of propitiating its critics is that to defend our terribly complicated liberal capitalism the citizenry would have to possess an intellectual subtlety that is utterly beyond it.

Great American Series

Whoso would be a man, must be a nonconformist. He who would gather immortal palms must not be hindered by the name of goodness, but must explore if it be goodness. Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind.

—Ralph Waldo Emerson

Third, in order to endure the daily grind that exists even in the sweetest society one must possess at least an emotional attachment to the social order, and as Kenneth Minogue has reminded us, it is extremely difficult to have an emotional commitment to our kind of liberal society, given its context.

Finally with all of the money floating about in our society, well, let's face it, it pays to blow spitballs at the system. Indeed it seems to me that the whole dynamics of the society in which we live makes the existence and the point of view of intellectuals inevitable. The system of higher education with its propensity for sectional unemployment, underemployment, and the tendency, for example, to mass-produce highly sensitized schoolteachers who will earn less than truck drivers (how often have you heard them grouse about this) is a perfect example of one of our liberal institutions cultivating its own cancers.

Liberal capitalism or modern bourgeois society while creating many marvels shaped a thing called intellectuals (I will not say liberal capitalism created intellectuals because they existed in slightly different forms centuries ago in monasteries and in the courts of aristocrats, high-toned joints like that). And while liberal capitalism was producing many wondrous and advanced blossoms, intellectuals were slowly multiplying and crawling throughout the vines. Now every society promises something or other. And capitalism in the words of Irving Kristol promised three things. "First of all it promised continued improvement in the material conditions of all of its citizens—a promise without precedent in history. Secondly, it promised an equally unprecedented measure of individual freedom for all these same citizens. And lastly, it held out the promise that, amidst this prosperity and liberty, the individual could satisfy his instinct for self-perfection—for leading a virtuous life that satisfied the demands of his spirit (or, as one used to say, his soul)—and that the free exercise of such individual virtue would aggregate into a just society." Well, the intellectuals have their affluence and they have their freedom. But most certainly they do not have their just society or their sense of a just society. And it is my contention that, as I hope I have suggested from the above analysis, they never will have their just society. The characteristics they embrace will not allow them to satisfy that appetite. And because of the eminence they maintain and the characteristics they embrace, it is unlikely that there are any adjustments minor or major that we can make which will assuage this furious crisis in confidence. Not so long as our society is liberal, democratic, and capitalist—even welfare capitalist.

R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

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"Whom the gods destroy they first make mad"– Euripedes

Current Wisdom

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

A strange literary creature caught inhabiting one of TRB's wonderful columns:

Income distribution in America is violently unequal.

—The New Republic

SUNDAY SCHOOL CHIC

As yet another service to our readers, we present, unexpurgated, two intellectually challenging games, guaranteed to reawaken the spiritual appetites of all New Age Methodists and their asinine cousins in Christ. These spiritual exercises have been lifted from the Sunday school guide of New Creation, a how-to-do-it book for saving souls published by the General Board of Education of the United Methodist Church, Inc.—the very same United Methodist Church which in an earlier era promoted such civic causes as the Volstead Act, Ku Kluxery, and lynch law for the heathens. Hallelujah!:

Ask the Volunteer Committee to listen to popular or recently popular protest records, to hear musical references to the ills of our times.

Be sure a fairly broad range of the sicknesses of our society is included in the record excerpts selected for playing as class members arrive. For example, even though there may be many unusually effective war protest records, it would be of little value to play these protests while ignoring the ecological, human rights, poverty, and alienation problems which confront us.

After the record excerpts are played, list the "signs of sickness" in our society which class members suggest are illustrated in the records which have been played.

Compare the list on your chalkboard with that in *New Creation* which begins, "looking at this nation, Ezeckiel saw . . ."

OR

Do some "ball brainstorming," as an alternative to playing excerpts from protest records.

Secure a small rubber ball or tennis ball. Proceed with the "ball brainstorming" as follows: The person who is "IT," throws the ball to anyone else around the circle and proceeds to count to 10. The person who gets the ball must, before the count of 10 is completed, begin to mention "something which is wrong with us" as a nation. However, failing to get underway by the count of 10, the person is "out." A person is also "out" if he mentions something which someone else has already suggested.

The obvious purpose of this game is to do quick,on-the-spot thinking about the ills about us; to listen to what others say; and to see how many ills can be mentioned in a few minutes.

—New Creation

DEPARTMENT OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS

A chilling analysis of Nixonian America by the UPI's Nicholas Daniloff, Kremlinologist and fictioneer:

For this former Moscow correspondent, one of the sobering reflecturies of democratic practice, there is no guarantee against the development of totalitarian attitudes in the White House.

Of course, the degree to which White House officials may have been guilty of totalitarian attitudes is far less than in Stalin's Russia. There have been no purge trials, executions or sentences of exile. But there are some startling similarities.

—St. Louis Post-Dispatch

SPEAKING IN BUGABOOS

While lecturing about Watergate, the eminent historian, Henry Steele Commager, lays it on thick to his spellbound audience:

The roots of our current malaise go back to the paranoia about communism—first Soviet, then Chinese—that obsessed Americans after 1947. So deep and pervasive was this paranoia that—like the Southern commitment to slavery before the Civil War and to white Supremacy after the war—in time it came to dominate our lives and our thoughts, to color our views of politics, economy, education, science, and morality. As in the worlds of Kafka and Orwell. . . .

—New York Review of Books

A YAHOO LOOK AT YAHOOS

The horrors of democracy as imagined by Mr. John Leonard, defender of freedom and spokesman for the oppressed:

So the First Amendment has been parceled out to 50 states for 50 different glosses according to 50,000 community standards arrived at by 200-million average inferences. Imagine the mostly-male State Legislature of Georgia deciding whether the raft of new books on female sexuality is obscene, no matter how important such explorations are to women, including Georgia women, for a rehabilitated consciousness. Imagine the differing perceptions, in Baton Rouge or Trenton, of what's patently offensive in a novel featuring black-white sexual relations. Suppose Al Carmine's new musical, "The Faggot," were to tour: okay, maybe, in New Orleans, but in Lubbock or Pierre? We've seen what California did to its textbooks to keep kids from being brainwashed by the theory of evolution. Yahoos everywhere are already telling us we can't mention "Mafia" and that "Huckleberry Finn" is racist. Librarians, bar the doors: here come your average vigilantes.

—New York Times Book Review

THE DEMOCRATIC LOVE AFFAIR

Telltale elitism from one of the most conspicuous organs of participatory democracy:

Constitutionally it is absurd to argue that the "average" person in the local community—which the Court did not define; it could be the state, a county, a city, a town, a village or part of any of these—can decide, with only the loosest guidelines, what is allowable and what is to be banned.

—Nation

POPULAR OPPRESSORS

Another of those curious slips that makes even gullible readers of the Nation a bit suspicious:

Many Americans, then, did have reason to be upset by the direction of education reform in the 1960s, but they took out their grievances by supporting politicians who would only make the situation worse. It is not the first time in history that people have supported their oppressors out of fear of change.

—Nation

DEPARTMENT OF THE SECOND RATE

An effortless fountain of bosh from one of the millions of undistinguished louts who will soon be graduated from the great universities of the land and dropped back into the nation's vast welter of nameless secondraters, there to simmer:

With the exception of Chairman Sam Ervin, Republican Sen. Lowell Weicker is the most gratifyingly uncool interrogator on the Senate's Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Practices. Weicker's presentation is enough to pacify the disgruntled soap opera fan; he straightarms the legal abstraction and lays it all on the line.

Weicker's approach is gratifying, first of all, because waiving correct courtroom procedure enables him to get to the nitty-gritty of the misconduct of the Nixon administration, much of which transcends illegality. By dwelling on human ideals and ethics, Weicker has an automatic "in," since the authoritarian Nixon administration has always displayed a noticeable lack of real human values.

Of course, Weicker does have a few axes to grind with the Nixon administration, particularly its attempt to pin illegal campaign financing on him. And he has two prominent friends—former presidential counsel John Dean and former FBI Director L. Patrick Gray—who now probably rank at the top of the White House Enemies List.

Mike Byrne
—Indiana Daily Student

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CONTINUING CRISIS

(continued from page 2)

CBS neurotics considered a Nixonian subterfuge, was relaxed when our Russian partners in *détente* took up *détente*.

● President Nixon was up to his old tricks. Early in the month the Federal Court of Appeals ordered him to yield his tapes to Judge Sirica, but on October 19 Mr. Nixon hatched a compromise, acceded to by Senator Ervin and Senator Baker on October 20. Later in the day Special Prosecutor Cox discommoded the Administration by expressing his intention to pursue the tapes anyway and was canned, and after Attorney General Richardson resigned, so was Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus. But as the pother of impeachment bestirred the nation, Mr. Nixon moved from trick to treat. On October 23 he agreed to cough up the tapes to Judge Sirica.

● In Nashville Judge Charles Galbreath claimed that if officials insist on prosecuting him for a $5 parking violation, they will have to impeach him first. A truck load of Tootsie Rolls was highjacked in Chicago, and humanitarians were distraught at the news that researchers at the University of Virginia have discovered that the most common method by which cold virus is transported is from shaking hands. Rumors are circulating in Saint Petersburg, Florida, that the erstwhile western star, Mr. Lash Larue, who was arrested seven years ago for vagrancy, has become an evangelist for Mission Power Headquarters and Home of the Apostles, Inc. At Harvard visiting lecturer, Mr. Leonard Bernstein, was given a taste of the new politics when a bomb threat interrupted his lecture on Mozart's G Minor Symphony. The poet Auden and the cellist Casals expired, and Mr. Richard Butkus intends to retire at the end of this season.

● So the land continues to soak in corruption. Forty-eight hours had not elapsed after Mr. Nixon's promotion of Rep. Ford when reports were out on the wire services that Mr. Ford's son John was having the plumbing repaired in his apartment at plush Utah State University. It is now certain that the man who instructed his nephew on how to rig the 1973 National Soapbox Derby, one Mr. Robert Lange, Sr., will not serve a day in jail for his felonious misdeeds. And Senator Proxmire lied while being accosted by two would-be muggers. Finally a civil liberties struggle is raging in San Francisco where repressive forces are attempting to construct a one million dollar suicide prevention barrier on the Golden Gate bridge.

● October was indeed a grim month. Washington continues its evolution towards the politics of Byzantium and in San Francisco they contemplate erecting an existential Berlin Wall—Alas and Fie! □

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